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# West Europe Report

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4 June 1984

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## BAHR ASSERTS SECURITY IN REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 13 Feb 84 pp 36-37

[Article by Egon Bahr, SPD disarmament expert, member of the International Disarmament Commission of which the present head is the Swedish Minister President Olof Palme: "Atomic Class Distinctions"]

[Text] We are living in the post-Pershing age; that means that we have to expect a phase of rearmament and of rerearmament.

On the one hand the "Pershing 2" is a weapon which can reach the territory of the Soviet Union (and is therefore strategic). On the other hand it is not one of the strategic weapons of the United States but rather from the point of view of Washington it has been decoupled from the strategic chain of command and has been transferred to NATO.

Operatively incapable of reaching the SS-20, if it were fully in place it could knock out an interesting percentage of the intercontinental Soviet rocket silos and thus shift in favor of the United States the strategic balance agreed upon between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Pershing would then become a nonstrategic weapon having a strategic function and would confront the Soviet Union with a need to decide whether it is compelled to escalate on the strategic plane in reply. To that extent the Pershing 2 may be looked upon as a decoupling element between the United States and Europe.

The Soviet Union early became aware of this danger to itself and in reply chose the route of a missile (SS-20) which is stationed "forward" with a flight time less than 3 minutes, in other words is stationed in the GDR and in the CSSR. Military danger from atomic weapons close to the combat zone exists for both sides. Militarily I can see no other logic in the SS-22 except as a weapon which can be used early enough to prevent the firing of the Pershing 2.

Robert McNamara shares the opinion that the Pershing 2 prompts the Soviets to undertake a preemptive strike. To that extent the Pershing 2 together with the following Soviet SS-22 response becomes a decoupling weapon. That is the new and more dangerous situation which confronts the FRG alone.

For years I have become more and more firmly convinced that both superpowers in a crisis would attempt to limit a war to Europe and that both superpowers are creating the instruments necessary for such a purpose.

The improbability of a planned World War III corresponds to the improbability that in this case it would be possible to limit nuclear war. The danger lies in a conflict beginning in the Middle East or in the Near East in which the two superpowers become involved and which then spreads horizontally to Europe. This could become the classical case of a limited nuclear war. That both superpowers would seek a limitation is in accord with their vital interest. Whether or not they achieve such a limitation would no longer be a matter of interest to Europe. There can be no doubt that they are creating technologically distinct weapon systems below the strategic systems.

The common security of all participants in the alliance is the cement of that alliance. Limitation of war, in other words limitation of the risk (the Pershing), triggers war. Coupling of the risk between the United States and Europe remains the prerequisite of a functioning security for both.

The actual situation is even worse. We are confronted not only with the possibility of a limitation of a war to Europe but also the possibility of a limitation within Europe. When the French and British atomic weapons are declared to be weapons which will be used only in the most extreme case--namely when one's own national existence is in question--then this constitutes a decoupling of the two European nuclear powers from the common risk facing their nonnuclear European allies.

France and Great Britain advertise their reservations regarding the use of their strategic weapons. They have a perfect right to do so. Such a reservation would be ineffectual in the case of the improbable large-scale war, but it would be quite effective in the event of a conflict entering Europe from another region. In such a case this reservation would open up to the Soviet Union limited options both geographically and politically.

The Soviet Union need not fear the nuclear engagement of France and Great Britain; because their national existence would not be at stake. Their troops would be involved in the FRG, but that would be a limited risk. Atomic combat-field weapons would become weapons of war where they are in place: in other words among us.

The objection which is made against the validity of every strategic idea, namely that it need not necessarily hold is also applicable in this case. But worst-case thinking is certainly in order whenever one's own existence is at issue.

In any case as long as Paris and London reject nuclear solidarity then it is hard to see how there can be any growth in the role and importance of Europe for its own security--and such growth would certainly be desirable.

It is not a good thing for the alliance when Moscow can assume different degrees of risk for France/Great Britain and for the nonnuclear members of NATO.

Neither Europe nor the alliance can tolerate the nuclear decoupling of England and France from the rest. Anyhow, it is not enough to base our confidence in deterrence essentially upon the Soviet assurance that a European nuclear war could not be limited. Such confidence in the Soviet doctrine of massive threat is impermissible.

There is too much being said about vulnerability to blackmail or possible Soviet pressure on good behavior. Anyone who fears that for the Government of the FRG is overlooking the fact that in the past 25 years during which it had superiority through the SS-4 and SS-5 and SS-20 (allegedly its monopoly) the Soviet Union never attempted to apply such pressure, knowing well that the United States would never allow the FRG to be blackmailed. We and others are not so sovereign that it would be possible for us to become de facto satellites of the USSR, even supposing that we wished to.

But one can very well imagine the pressure which would exist on Paris and London to avoid staking their own existence in the event of a conflict having limited goals, in other words the pressure upon them to avoid using strategic nuclear weapons. Anyone who hears the political definition of these weapons as weapons for the last extremity can assume that Soviet pressure, to be effective, would not have to be so frightfully great.

It would be an absurdity if in the future we were to have three types of cruise missile: American-strategic by sea, American-nonstrategic on the continent, with power of decision resting with the American president, and the same in Great Britain, with British veto power. Precisely this would be an invitation to decoupling. We have not defeated the three-class franchise merely in order to reintroduce it in the domain of security.

On the Soviet side the view is maintained that two forms of balance are being pursued; a strategic global balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and a further balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, with the Americans naturally also being involved in this second balance (below their strategic weapons) with this balance ranging from conventional weapons systems to medium-range systems. It must be recognized that such a view contemplates western Europe as a unit in the domain of security. On the other hand it represents an autonomous balance in Europe set free from the strategic system of the two superpowers. It can be argued that such a view would aim at isolating Europe from the United States. In any case it is a design, of Soviet manufacture, for limiting a conflict to Europe. Also there exists sufficient evidence that the Soviet military forces recognize such situation-categories as the possibility of bringing a conflict to a halt, in other words the possibility of limiting an atomic conflict.

It is childish to deplore the fact that the Socialist Mitterrand has not defined the role and the importance of the French nuclear weapon in a manner which is essentially different from the definition given by de Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing. In this Mitterrand is not betraying socialist ideas but is only responding to the compulsion exercised by the nature of atomic weapons.

Such weapons make the behavior of nuclear states calculable. None of them is going to share with another country--not even with his best friend--a decision which would mean an atomic inferno for his own country. Everyone must try to deflect it from his country; everyone must try to limit a conflict and if it becomes nuclear must try to keep it on a "glacis" if such a theater is available.

This is necessitated by the national interests of the individual nuclear states. Anyone who complains about that must want to render inoperative the laws which govern nuclear weapons and which govern the behavior of states. But this brings up the question as to how we can best pursue our security interests.

At the outset there must be the recognition that there exist elementary distinctions between nuclear and nonnuclear countries. These differences cut across blocks. These differences exist just as much as the no less elementary differences between democratic and nondemocratic countries. The nuclear countries are a special club united by the magnitude of their responsibility and by the impossibility of sharing it.

No nuclear state shares its decision regarding the use of a weapon which determines its own existence with any other country, even less does it share such a decision with a nonnuclear country. Consultations are fairy tales for the nonnuclear children.

If the minister of defense in Bonn cannot imagine that in a crisis the American president would pay no attention to the advice of the FRG then one might replace his assumed de facto veto right even by a written one.

If before the invasion of Grenada, which is still a part of the Commonwealth, Reagan ended the consultation with Margaret Thatcher with the words "talking is over--action is on" one can imagine the style which he would adopt in a case involving the very existence of the United States. In a crisis people would die; this could be after consultation, for those who found it easier that way. The question is only: Is it possible to limit the dying?

The answers from Washington, Moscow, Paris and London are clear. They will try to limit it. They must try to do so in the interest of humanity. Whether they shall be successful is something which we shall know nothing about.

The nuclear powers decide the fate of the nonnuclear powers. The nonnuclear powers do not decide the fate of the nuclear powers. We do not even decide our own existence. In the long term this will be intolerable. Such inequality must shatter any alliance.

In earlier times it was an accepted definition that people whose existence was decided upon by other countries are colonial territories. I consider that it is not possible permanently for a government of the FRG to hand over to another head of state existentially decisive responsibility for our own people and our own country. To do so would violate the inalienable right to self-determination.



The constitution permits no German federal government to evade final responsibility for our own country. Such a government may not escape the pressure which attaches to such responsibility. Under democracy such a responsibility is in the last analysis assigned to it by the mandate of its citizens. When we assume that in the extreme situation others shall decide for us then this assumption also has a certain historical dimension: it will mean that we are getting just what we deserve.

In questions of security our sovereignty is no less than that of Italy and Norway or that of the Netherlands and Belgium. The sovereignty of the nonnuclear countries is limited to their capacity to say yes or no to the stationing of atomic weapons on their soil. Once they have said yes then others make the decisions. If they say no then they assume greater responsibility for credible conventional defense in the alliance, under the protection provided by the strategic weapons of the nuclear states.

None of the schemes supported, on different bases, by the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain, with what is for them the logical goal of limiting a nuclear war, is acceptable for the nonnuclear European countries. This includes the current NATO strategy of flexible response.

Proposals to raise the nuclear threshold, to increase conventional armament, in the interest of the nuclear as well as of the nonnuclear states are inadequate as long as the means to achieve limited nuclear war are not eliminated.

All of this implies the need to work for a common policy on the part of the nonnuclear countries with this goal: no nuclear weapons on the soil of countries who do not control them. This goal requires in parallel an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries with regard to an approximate conventional balance. Approximate conventional balance means too high a risk for an enemy engaging in a conventional attack. Denuclearization must not be permitted to increase the possibility of a conventional war.

Such a security policy would eliminate nuclear field weapons, which have been getting progressively smaller and more accurate and would also put an end to discussion of the possibility of limiting a nuclear war. The entire discussion of the question as to whether or not in a general nuclear war escalation would be automatic or nonautomatic would become an empty discussion; even the nuclear powers would in consequence obtain greater security. The nuclear threshold would be raised up to that point at which it still makes sense for the limited time (stay of execution) in which pure nuclear deterrence is operative.

The allied troops in our midst would carry no greater risk than the Germans, the Italians, the Canadians, the Danes, the Dutch and the Belgians. A risk acceptable for these units would also have to be acceptable for Americans, British and French; under the binding law of equal risk.

The guarantees which the nuclear states have given for nonnuclear South America, namely the guarantees never to use atomic weapons against countries in which none are located, would have to be repeated for the nonnuclear

countries of the two alliances in Europe. Such guarantees would be credible because naturally atomic weapons are the preferred atomic targets.

Where nuclear weapons vanish, nuclear targets vanish. Today it is possible to aim nuclear missiles at any desired point on earth, but why should they be aimed at countries from which no nuclear threat issues? Sweden knew why years ago it decided to reject the manufacture of its own nuclear weapon: this decision gave it more security.

We would have a situation in which the full measure of equality would be obtained which is possible between nuclear and nonnuclear countries. All would have more security. And that is probably the meaning of a discussion of new strategies which is now being accelerated by missile stationing.

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## BAHR'S ANTINUCLEAR THESES CHALLENGED AS NATIONALISTIC

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 30 Mar 84 p 68

[Article by Karl Kaiser, professor of political science and director of the Research Institute of the German Foreign Policy Society: "Nationalism in Antinuclear Garb: Egon Bahr and the Return to the National State Idea in Security Policy"]

[Text] The decision of the Bundestag in November of last year to carry out the NATO double resolution of 1979 has had a sedative and clarifying effect upon security policy discussion in the FRG. The discussions have shifted from public mass protest at the Bundestag through committees, party congresses, discussions by experts and discussions in the media. The security policy outpouring of energy in protest and discussion which has been observable since 1981 falls into certain categories:

First, there is the fundamental opposition to nuclear deterrence, which searches for real alternatives. Within this category may be found the most various directions of opinion, from pacifists to adherents of a radically de-nuclearized defense, from convinced neutralists to simple escapists and the unavoidable communist fellow travelers. At the same time this group is becoming the institutionalized minority, permanently challenging the security policy majority. The Greens, parts of the intelligentsia and public professionals constitute the hard core of this group together with some slight overlappings into the left wing of the SPD.

Secondly, there are the reformers of strategy. To this latter group belong the preponderant majority of those social democrats who, borne aloft by the base wave, attempted to ruin the NATO double resolution. Their dynamism is directed, moreover--with some help from the leadership of the SPD parliamentary fraction--toward a broadly based effort to secure an improvement in rather than a replacement of the current Western strategy. The growing awareness that real alternatives over the long term actually are not available does not prevent them from engaging in discussion bearing the label "alternative strategies." Essentially there are two primary directions of opinion involved: reduction of dependence upon early use of nuclear weapons (raising the nuclear threshold) and strengthening of the European components in Atlantic security policy. As might be expected there exist on the edges of this discussion of strategy fluid transitions over to more radical alternatives, such as nonfirst use of nuclear weapons or discussions of a nuclear-free zone.



This discussion is not limited to the SPD. It has also been carried on now for a long while within the security policy establishment and in the government coalition. The NATO High Command as well as Defense Minister Woerner have also adopted as their theme the raising of the nuclear threshold through improved conventional defense and strengthening of the European components of security policy had already been the subject of expert discussions before Federal Chancellor Kohl seized upon the idea.

At the same time a new situation is becoming discernible. A large part of the security policy energies which have become active in the FRG could be made useful for the desirable improvement in current strategy--to some extent even in the interplay between the government and the Social Democrats. Such a joint process is also further facilitated by the fact that regardless of all the turbulence stirred up by the NATO double resolution the SPD has permanently strengthened the safety policy consensus which has existed since 1960, namely adherence to the alliance and to orientation toward the West.

The decision as to whether the FRG will take part in an evolutionary and stabilizing process of further development in strategy or whether the individuals and groups pressing for alternative security ideas, for revisions in the West-oriented foreign policy and for neutralism shall be able to challenge the existing consensus depends entirely upon one factor: the further behavior of the SPD.

If the SPD were to associate itself with efforts taking place outside its own ranks and also with groups within its left wing who have only grudgingly swallowed adherence to the NATO alliance (referred to as "lyricism") in the resolution of the Cologne special party congress then this would certainly give rise to an internal political controversy over the foreign policy and security policy basic orientation of the FRG which would go even more deeply than the controversies over the armament resolution.

The SPD faces this danger. This is revealed in opinions recently developed by Egon Bahr in a SPIEGEL essay entitled "Atomic Class Distinctions." He was the creator and coauthor of that adaptation of Eastern and German policy which was long overdue and which has in the interim been adopted by what was then the opposition, now has great authority within and outside his own party. Ever since the discussion of the neutron weapon he has had an influence on the erosion of the security policy basis of the SPD-FDP coalition and has also influenced with decisive slogans and ideas the slow falling away of the SPD from its armament resolution. His current ideas are not entirely new, but the circumstances are unusual.

What is involved is the proposal that in principle all nuclear weapons be withdrawn from the soil of those countries which do not have those weapons under their autonomous control--in other words the proposal that these nuclear weapons be transferred into the nuclear states or to the ocean. Even the Palme Commission rejected this idea. A working group employed by the SPD party chairman mentioned the proposal in its final report of last summer as one of two alternative possible developments without expressing any opinion about it. However, the decisive defeat of this proposal took place in January

of this year when the responsible commission after what was in part a vigorous discussion rejected the motion that this proposal be taken up in the program for the Essen Party Congress of the SPD in May 1984, a congress which will be designed to discuss new strategies. The result of this vote reflected efforts on the part of the Bonn SPD leadership to stop any further slippage in the party. The fact that Egon Bahr is pushing aside the usual solidarity among Social Democrats with the majority decision in order with the help of publicity to bring the forthcoming party congress over to his side shows how important the project is in his eyes.

In fact something more is involved than the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the nonnuclear states. Bahr's proposal is embedded in a number of interpretations and strategic ideas which have in part already been drafted in the past with regard to the East-West conflict and with regard to the nuclear status of the FRG and these strategic ideas amount to nothing less than a general revision of the foreign policy and security policy of the FRG. If the proposal were to become reality what would be the strategic consequences?

The already existing superiority of the Soviet Union in the domain of tactical nuclear weapons would be dramatically enhanced. The Soviet Union would need to do nothing with its SS-20 armament, which is declining in importance. Only the systems which are in any case superannuated and the few new systems of shorter and medium range (SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23) would be withdrawn behind the Soviet-Polish border while all land-supported American systems in Europe would disappear behind the Atlantic. The missiles of the Soviet Union with which it can reach the entire West European forward area would remain untouched while its opponent, the United States, would have to withdraw. To the United States there would remain only the option of precariously sea-supported missiles and aircraft in European waters. Egon Bahr requires of the Soviet Union even less than what is required by the peace movement which in principle calls for an area of disarmament reaching as far as the Urals.

The possibility of political blackmail through nuclear weapons created by such a superiority is simply argued away. Thus in a conversation with Kurt Biedenkopf in Bielefeld we hear the assertion that "Nobody can be blackmailed who doesn't want to let himself be blackmailed" and we also hear in Bahr's SPIEGEL essay "The Americans would not allow the FRG to be blackmailed." The first argument would be valid at best in a commando society, such as we are not. As though in democracies governments were still capable of autonomous action in response to such a question! The neutron weapon discussion which was initiated by Egon Bahr himself has already given a foretaste of what would happen in European democracies if a general public made fearful by nuclear weapons discussion and by Soviet threats were to put pressure upon their politicians. It simply is not the case that Moscow has never yet made such an attempt: they did in 1956 during the Suez crisis and this was during a period of American superiority.

Besides, it is doubtful whether in the event of a Soviet attempt at blackmail the United States would even be in a position to help its allies--quite apart from the question of whether it would want to assist European allies which had deliberately exposed themselves to a blackmailing situation. Henry

Kissinger's most recent assertions give ample grounds to assume that European weakness would result not in an American readiness to help but rather could trigger a withdrawal syndrome.

The consequences for the prevention of war are equally devastating. Egon Bahr proceeds on the basis of two assumptions: he assumes that the principal problem of Europe is the threat of a limited atomic war and he assumes that this possibility would disappear if the weapons were withdrawn from the non-nuclear states. Now, the consequence of his proposal would be that virtually no diminution in the capacity for a limited atomic war on the part of the Soviets while on the part of the Americans such a possibility would be radically reduced.

With Bahr as with others, for example, Guenter Gaus, one can discern a yearning for the strategy of "massive retaliation": how nice it would be if the two big powers could only carry out nuclear war over our heads and leave us untouched.

Since Egon Bahr makes it clear that states do not commit suicide in the interest of others, the return to "massive retaliation" which is embodied in his idea represents an invitation to completely unsettle the security of central Europe: limited aggressions would now once again be possible; it would no longer be possible to hold on to Berlin, conventional war would again be more probable. An escape from nuclear deterrence as the core element of war prevention is not possible over the long term; the best that is possible consists of stabilizing measures within the context of arms control or improvement in conventional capabilities in order to raise the nuclear threshold. But radical changes like the denuclearization proposed by Egon Bahr can become a recipe for catastrophe.

In addition to this the Bahr proposal contains a new interpretation of the East-West conflict and of the alliance. The reduction in the East-West conflict is radical. All that remains is the problem of nuclear war: "In a crisis people will die." The whole power conflict and social-political conflict disappears. The problem of conventional wars, also as sources of nuclear wars, does not exist. Implicitly likenesses are assumed where actually there exist profound differences: differences both between the two world powers and differences among the nonnuclear states in the East and in the West. A veil is drawn over that social-political reality which now as in the past constitutes the unbridgeable opposition between Western democracies and those countries where people who think differently end up in jail or in psychiatric clinics or labor camps.

The United States is subjected to subtle defamation. The Soviet Union as a power-political threat is silently disregarded. American and Soviet nuclear weapons systems are measured with different yardsticks: evidently the American weapons are more dangerous since it is necessary for them to be withdrawn all the way back to America while the Soviet weapons are shifted only a short distance to the east. The maintenance of European peace is to an exaggerated degree seen as the responsibility of the United States and its strategic potential while at the same time resentment against the Americans is poked up

by interpreting the dependence of the FRG upon American nuclear protection as a form of colonial status.

The negation of the alliance is shocking: by appealing to misunderstood gaullist arguments of the fifties it is represented that when it comes to nuclear protection it is impossible to rely on any other country. "Consultations are fairy tales for the nonnuclear children." As though the nuclear dilemmas were not already very well known for decades! The complex structure of agreements, interdependencies and closest consultation in nuclear questions is simply pushed off the table together with the guidelines for weapons use, targets, consultations in the improvement of which even Social Democratic defense ministers have been participants. There is also a degree of wantonness which is not confirmed by a false analogy with Grenada. In addition it is an absurd notion that the Americans in Germany would trigger a nuclear war against the will of the German Government. In addition they couldn't do such a thing wantonly since such an action would risk the lives of a half million American citizens on German soil.

The ideas regarding the sovereignty and the nuclear status of the FRG which are associated with Bahr's proposal amount to a basic revision of German foreign policy and security policy.

The concept of nuclear sovereignty is highly stylized. For Egon Bahr what is decisive is the atomic class distinction and not the East-West conflict or any other differences in national life. Nuclear powers decide the fate of the nonnuclear. According to him the decisive attribute of sovereignty is denied to the latter. Therefore for him the FRG is a "colonial territory" and he considers it "impossible" that the FRG would hand over to any state whatever the decision as to nuclear weapons in violation of the "inalienable right to self-determination." He maintains that this difference in status would be intolerable over the long term. "This inequality must shatter any alliance." The message is clear: the alliance between the nonnuclear FRG and nuclear United States has no permanent basis. The immediately obvious contradiction is only marginally noted: How can one correct this nuclear class society by banning nuclear weapons from one's own territory? But more important is the reanimation of a long superseded concept of sovereignty which has been left far behind by the mature interdependence of German freedom and security, by the manifold interrelationships and institutions and by the constructive labor of decades in the creation of a community of democracies. Bahr's concept of sovereignty would make it impossible for the FRG to accept an obligation in any alliance.

These ideas are based upon an illogical Gaullism. Bahr simply overlooks the essential prerequisites of de Gaulle's policy. In the first place the general understood the limits of French power and he had a feeling for the European balance of power: the Gallic cock crowed loudly only because he was certain that an American dog in the farmyard was protecting him from the red fox. Secondly, de Gaulle's policy was based upon national access to nuclear weapons. A German Gaullism would lack such a foundation.



Bahr turns back to the classical idea of a national state which was current before 1945. In his 1982 book "What Is To Become of the Germans?" he gives a shocking hint: "Herr Jodl was not a signatory to any agreement that Germany as a whole would be at anyone else's nuclear disposal. The objective power of deciding upon the existence of Germany by permitting the use under certain circumstances of nuclear weapons cannot be inferred from the articles of surrender of the Third Reich." In other words are we to have a negation of the basic historic changes which emerged after the surrender of Hitler Germany with the establishment of Soviet power on the Elbe, with the entrance of the FRG into the community of western Europe and of the West? Has the peace-preserving function of western European integration become irrelevant and must the FRG now withdraw from what is allegedly an objectively impossible alliance between nonnuclear and nuclear powers?

How actually should an FRG left to its own devices relate to that world power which extends from Vladivostok to the Elbe? What a presumptuous notion! In place of a complex network of security, of obligation and mutual obligation to put a nationalistic idea of the state which harks back to the years before 1945!

If one thinks through to the end Egon Bahr's ideas about nuclear sovereignty and if at the same time one keeps an eye on the vulnerability of Berlin and of the FRG together with the enormous power monopoly of the Soviet Union then one can come to only two conclusions: either the FRG would become sovereign in his sense of the word and would have its own atomic weapons or it would have to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union and attempt as a junior partner of the Soviet Union in western Europe to preserve for itself some minimum of freedom of movement. Just the very first step in either direction would suffice to tumble the structure of European stability like a house of cards.

It is high time that things should be called by their proper name. Certainly there are always excellent protective clauses which may be cited to attest one's loyalty to the alliance or to our bond with the United States. But in the end these turn out to be walls of cardboard behind which another reality comes into view: the concept of a Germany which encapsulates itself and shifts its postwar relationships. In the foreground the issue appears to be one of nuclear weapons and the limitation of nuclear damage; but in reality what is involved is the stability of the European and Atlantic state system which is dependent upon continuity.

It is true that the debate among Social Democrats over armament has had the final effect of strengthening the bond to NATO, but nevertheless some keystones have been loosened. Why does not the SPD pause for a breathing spell and acknowledge with satisfaction that the reorientation in Eastern policy and German policy and detente policy which it established is being continued successfully in precisely the same way by the new government just as back in its time the SPD successfully continued Adenauer's policy of integration in Europe and in the West? The chances for a rational continued development of what is now a common heritage are not at all bad. Besides, the confused international situation makes this mandatory for both government and opposition.

But if the Social Democratic strategy debate were now to develop into discussing revision of the foundations of German foreign policy this would throw a new burden on our internal politics. Within the population of the FRG the majorities are certainly clear. An attempt at foreign policy revisionism would lead the SPD into a long-lasting ghetto existence.

"The nuclear powers decide the fate of the nonnuclear powers. The nonnuclear powers do not decide the fate of the nuclear powers. We do not even decide our own existence.... Such inequality must shatter any alliance.... All of this implies the need to work for a common policy on the part of the nonnuclear countries with this goal: no nuclear weapons on the soil of countries who do not control them...." From Egon Bahr's SPIEGEL essay "Atomic Class Distinctions" (13 Feb 84)

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## DANKERT ON EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS, FUNCTIONS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 4 Apr 84 pp 60-69

[Interview with European Parliament Chairman Piet Dankert by Kris Lelievre-Damit: "Something Has Indeed Changed"; in Brussels; date not specified]

[Text] On 17 June there will be elections for the European Parliament. In the first of a series of interviews, Chairman Piet Dankert of that parliament talks about his institution.

One thing is sure. The European elections of 17 June will certainly not be announced with the same drum roll as in 1979. At that time it was a matter of the first direct European elections, after a relatively long period during which the local European entity was tapping its feet. Anyway, with so many important political leaders heading the candidate lists, the European Parliament naturally was expected to give new momentum to the Community. The European Parliament was to inaugurate the Europe of the third opportunity.

Now we know better. Even though the European Parliament had its innings now and then, it has not been able to prevent the council of ministers from bringing Europe closer to destruction. If things continue the way they are, the Brussels Summit of a few weeks ago is only the beginning of all the trouble. And yet we are supposed to go to the European voting booth again, even though the people have more and more the impression that Europe is something for politicians. Piet Dankert is speaking.

[Question] You said once that citizens know little about Europe. And what they do know only concerns the deficiencies. Is it permissible to make such a statement when 434 European members of parliament have been let loose on their voting public for a period of 5 years?

Piet Dankert: Those 434 European members of parliament are by no means able to canvass their voting districts in a normal manner. The European voting districts are way too large. Some members of parliament have to deal with 700,000 voters. You can't do that alone. I notice that even the British, who have a tremendous tradition in the area of their voting districts, also are relatively unknown to their voters.

That is the first problem. The second one is the communication of the European Parliament with the voter in general. In 1979 we had European elections which actually caused considerable to-do. Yet afterward one could see that publicity being nationalized, thus that the total activity of the European parliament was interpreted to the extent it was beneficial on the national level. If you increase the regional fund, for example, that is of interest to the Irish and the Italians, but you won't read a word about it in the Dutch or Belgian press. When you affect the agricultural policy, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom find it normal, but it is not so obvious to the French. Thus the French write about it. The non-existence of a true European publicity, the continual nationalizing of existing problems, is the second big handicap we encountered.

[Question] You're giving the impression that the European members of parliament themselves were not able to do much, or anything, about the image projected by their institution. Surely that can't be your intention?

Dankert: Certainly not. For that matter, if I look at what the European members of parliament have achieved during the past years, that certainly is not nothing. In my own party (Dankert is a Dutch socialist, Ed.), for example, I see that Europe was the extension of the activities of national politics. The big problem at the time was: how in heaven's name can I distinguish myself from the christian democrats or the liberals? Everyone was in favor of a better and stronger Europe at that time.

Now, 5 years later, you can determine that in the European parliament there are clearly recognizable lines of separation. The Vredeling line, women's issues, well, there are very clearly topics on which the left and the right are divided. If you wanted to campaign as a socialist in 1979, it was hardly possible. Now that is all right. That in itself means that something has happened in Europe. Sometimes it is still unclear, but one does notice that the parliament is no longer a parliament for Europe now, but rather a parliament in which the various views on Europe deviate.

#### Double Mandates

[Question] But a great amount of money is still being spent for an objective campaign, isn't it?

Dankert: The money for the objective campaign amounts to 6 million accounting units. That is a lot of money, of course, but measured over 250 million Europeans it is not so much. Well now, that is true for the money for the objective campaign as well as for the money which afterwards flows to the parliamentary groups which put up 6 million ecus to guarantee that there is a European dimension in your campaign and that, as a voter, you will become convinced of the need for European politics. If that can be achieved that way, I find it justified.

Moreover, there is another phenomenon and that is that the Germans and Italians are subsidized already on the basis of their national legislation



alone. That alone is already much more money than what they would get from Europe. In the Federal Republic of Germany that is close to 5 marks per voter. The parties in the FRG get much more than what the entire European parliament spends altogether. Therefore you must make a European compromise in these sorts of things.

[Question] And if that is not done?

Dankert: Then you risk getting a much lower percentage in the elections, through which the political balance of the parliament will receive a big blow. You lose importance, and to spend 10 billion per year for an irrelevant parliament certainly won't do. I am more willing to put 100 million in a campaign in order to maintain the relevancy of the parliament than to run the risk that the parliament insufficiently reflects the relations in the Community.

[Question] Will it be an expensive election campaign, like in 1979?

Dankert: I don't know how the campaigns of the various groups will be handled exactly, but I think that, contrary to 1979, most political parties are very poor right now. In view of the economic situation, they have relatively fewer opportunities to get the necessary funds for the campaign from their followers. With the money they get from parliament they can only run a relatively minimal and normal campaign. It will in any event be a very short campaign.

[Question] This time it is apparently not the national showpieces which are the primary candidates, as in 1979. Doesn't the parliament need them in order to ensure a high attendance at the voting booth?

Dankert: As far as I'm concerned, they can get back on the lists if they do something for Europe and the parliament, and if they demonstrate a certain constant activity. In Belgium, for example, Karel van Miert did that very well. Although I do have words of criticism for him, in that respect he attended regularly and participated in everything. There are some, however, who were elected in 1979 and whom I hardly ever saw afterward. Craxi, for example, or Berlinguer. If you are elected, you have to ply that trade. For that matter, you're paid for it very well. The taxpayer has plenty of troubles already.

Anyway, it is not as highly necessary now to use showpieces because, contrary to 1979, the campaign will have more substance. In the FRG, for instance, it is not Kohl, but Katharina Focke who is the primary candidate for the Christian Democrats. In the Netherlands that phenomenon was not too important in 1979 either, and in the United Kingdom they're almost all new faces.

[Question] Fortunately that will decrease the number of double mandates, won't it?

Dankert: I am a devout opponent of the double mandate. In theory much can be said in favor of it, but you can see that the people who practice it spend

their time primarily in national politics. The few exceptions are hardly worth mentioning. Naturally one draws one's consequences from that.

#### Council and Commission

[Question] There hasn't been much progress either in uniformizing the voting system, has there?

Dankert: It should have been done this time, and it is indeed insane that it was not done. But that is to blame on the British opposition who consider their /constituency/ system saintly.

[Question] Thus the parliament had a proposal ready?

Dankert: Certainly, although personally I think that we should have adopted the German system. In my opinion that is the most easily manageable system, specifically, a mixture of national and regional lists. That means that, although the federations have the greatest influence on their candidates, for the precise composition of the list the party executive can indicate the specialists needed in certain areas. To please the British, however, we went to a sort of mixed-district system with various seats. That turned out to be impossible too, however, and now everyone is going his own way again.

[Question] You say that the discussions in the European Parliament have attained more ideological depth. The parties are no longer an extension of national politics. How should the citizen orientate himself for these European elections?

Dankert: A parliamentary group in the European Parliament naturally can never function in the same way as one in a national parliament for the simple reason that the various European groups are dependent on various national parties. Actually, it is the task of the parliamentary group chairman to determine the best way of reaching compromises. Anyway, a Belgian socialist, for instance, should not vote socialist in the European elections because he wants to see SP [Belgian Socialist Party] politics in Strasbourg. We have to get rid of that misconception. Europe is larger than the SP. The SP undoubtedly has a completely different opinion on the missiles than the French socialists.- The question of course is: how far can I go with my compromises? But that is a consideration everyone should decide for himself.

[Question] In your opinion, has the European Parliament been able to hold its own during the past few years against the Council and the Commission which together form the European Government?

Dankert: In the past, Europe was judged too much by jurists and not enough by political scientists. One has formal authority and one has influence. Personally I think that the second vision is more realistic. During the past years the influence of the directly elected parliament on Commission proposals has greatly increased (even though that does not mean that those proposals were adopted by the Council afterward). Moreover one can observe that a much

more intensive cooperation has come about in the relationship with the Council. I don't mean to say that the Council always gives a detailed report on its activities, but one can certainly notice a positive evolution. During the past years numerous ministers have been present at parliamentary commissions in order to explain the policy of the Council. That does not mean, of course, that we decide the policy with that, but there is definitely a greater mutual influence than before.

[Question] But that is not of great political advantage to us, is it?

Dankert: The parliament ought to work more toward the electorate because then, as European member of parliament, you have more of a hold on that national minister. Moreover, you should not look at things in such a negative manner. Take the budget procedure, for example, which came into being already during the time of the Belgian chairmanship. That shows clearly that parliament counts. The blocking of money for Margaret Thatcher last December is something similar. That led to not pushing ahead the British problem any longer, as happened in the past. Once again you see that the parliament and its spheres of influence have become real factors.

#### Compensations

[Question] You said once that the work of the European Parliament is done by 25 percent of the parliament members, didn't you?

Dankert: That is true in every parliament. That is not an abnormal situation. In a private enterprise also, a number of people are the driving force while most people prefer to stick to the status quo.

[Question] Except that those 75 percent are paid royally for doing nothing.

Dankert: Paid royally? That depends on how you look at it. Members of parliament get exactly what the national parliaments pay, except they get compensations as well. Karel van Miert regularly brings that up, but he should keep his mouth shut. He is not exclusively a European member of parliament. As to the daily compensations, the rates of pay are the same as, for instance, the West European Union or the Council of Europe. That is money for hotels and meals and those sorts of things. What we still find difficult to deal with are the lump sum travel compensations. I have always been an advocate, however, of a sort of credit card for parliament members with which they can travel as much as they want to. With it, all the real costs would be compensated for. With the current system things sometimes get out of hand. I have not succeeded, however, in making any change in that.

[Question] Some members of parliament are very good at this little game and make a nice sum of money with it. Take, for example, those Greek members of parliament who have taken their permanent residence somewhere on an isolated island in order to get more travel money, while in reality they live in an apartment in Brussels.

Dankert: I think there are indeed problems. However, in my opinion, with a parliament one should start from the idea that compensations deal with true costs. Any member of parliament who manipulates this situation to benefit by it is no good and may be hung, as far as I'm concerned. But that is not to blame on the system; it has nothing to do with parliament. Parliament should be able to effectively reimburse costs which were made. Anyway, European politics should cost something if they are functional, if they serve a purpose. As long as it has to do with politics and not with the wallet of the members of parliament. For example, it does not bother me that Gaston Thorn takes an airplane to a meeting, for otherwise he'll go crazy. But it does bother me when someone goes to a committee meeting, puts his signature down in order to be able to cash his daily compensation, and leaves immediately. But once again, it's not possible to find a good system for that.

[Question] There were a number of very interesting debates in parliament on peace and security, unemployment, the ecu report. Other debates were very shallow because of the differences between the groups. The Vredeling line, for example.

Dankert: Now wait a moment; parliament has a conservative, preservation-minded majority, and Mr Vredeling was progressive. Thus it is logical that parliament bowed down to the right in such a case. That is all right; it is up to the voter to elect a progressive majority. I find those sorts of things completely acceptable. As socialists, we also lost the 35-hour work week in the debate in Brussels. Fine, that means there was a majority for that view. Let the voter do something about it. For that matter, as I already said at the beginning of this discussion, that creates alternatives. Then we'll finally get rid of that nonsense that we must vote for Europe.

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## DEMOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION, SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY

Paris CONTREPOINT in French No 47, Spring 84 pp 125-130

[Article by Gérard-François Dumont, Ph D in Economics, graduated from the Paris Institute of Political Studies and the Poitiers Institute of Business Management: "The Demographic Parameter in the Development of Societies"]

[Text] The prevailing problems of societies bring to light how important demographic factors are. The scanty way in which they are taken into account, however, lowers the debates to an often less than constructive level. This acknowledgment can be made about immigration, social welfare and North-South, as well as East-West, relations.

#### Immigration Encouraged and Rejected

Through information released by the media on the trade-union movements at Citroën and the Dreux municipal elections of September 1983, the French were told what many of them already knew that, since the 1960's, the geographic origins of the people immigrating to France, which in the past had been made up essentially of Europeans, had changed. Most workers in Citroën's Aulnay plant are of Maghrebian origin. Immigrants are building almost one out of every two French cars and one out of every three kilometers of highway.

This immigration was encouraged by France and the French enterprises. This policy was also the result of a short-term choice consisting in rewarding work less than capital (taking into account, among other things, the tax terms governing the latter). The foreigners were not the ones to select Dreux to set up a large colony. It was the French who invited the immigrants to settle in Dreux in order to contribute to the French economy. As a matter of fact, after the war of 1945, France was faced with both the need to rebuild its economy and a significant growth potential, due in particular to the technical advances which had occurred. At the same time, however, France had to come to grips with the fact that its work force potential was greatly depleted due to a lower birth rate during the period between the two wars, a result of the large number of casualties during the 1914-1918 war.

Faced with this shortage of workers, the enterprises recruited extensively in foreign, and particularly Maghrebian, countries.



Rejecting previous economic choices, the France of 1945 decided to release the Malthusian grip and carry on the country's modernization. To achieve this goal, it had to hire workers from wherever it could find them.

Unfortunately, the planning stopped there, at a purely quantitative level. The immigrant workers had come to swell the ranks of the work force and that was their sole purpose. Population problems, however, are not only a question of number, they are also a question of quality. Men are not machines. They thirst for respect; their role far exceed that of worker.

### Two Principles of Harmony

As it stands, a country divided against itself cannot survive. The inhabitants of a territory can live in harmony only if they accept collectively to respect a minimum of common rules and values. The stability of a family, a classroom, a church and a community, like that of a society, rests on this absolute principle.

Now, what happened in France given the immigration after the war? What had to happen since the measures enabling the above-defined principle to be respected were not implemented. A country which receives immigrants must enter into a contract with them.

Where the workers appreciate the host country and are ready to become part of it while maintaining some cultural practices which are not alien to the country's general values. Assimilation is then the only possible way. It requires that the host country implement measures allowing this integration by first using an essential tool, language. The rule that immigrant workers must learn the language becomes imperative. If a country wants to use immigrant workers on a long-term basis, it must first teach them its language. A fortiori, naturalization requires the same condition. As it stands, this necessary requirement is not carried out. Let us look, for example, at what is specifically happening in immigrant families in France.

Firstly, the child of an immigrant worker born in France ipso facto acquires the French nationality, a laudable measure it must be added (or they may eventually have an irrevocable right to the French nationality. See the Nationality Code which specifies the conditions under which a child born in France acquires the French nationality, even if his parents are not naturalized.). It does not necessarily follow, however, that he acquires the language of his nationality, for his parents often use their native tongue, not necessarily because they refuse to use the language of their adoptive country, but because the host country was unable to implement the above-mentioned imperative rule, i.e., learning the language.

Secondly, the child finds himself in a rigid French school whose subjects and pedagogical methods were defined for children presumed to be living in French-speaking families. He inevitably has enormous difficulties learning his language, for, let us recall, his nationality is French.

Thirdly, the integration of this so-called second generation raises even more problems. To be sure, the assimilation of these children could occur more

easily if they were placed in a classroom in which most of the children were assimilated French. The situation is quite different, however, for immigrant workers are often concentrated in neighborhoods or geographic areas instead of being dispersed among the population. This results in classrooms in which more than half of the children are without a culture, uprooted and subjected to an education which was not conceived to answer their special needs. It is therefore French society which is guilty of forming people without a culture.

Thus the problems of large cities are exacerbated due to demographic factors which were not taken into account, because this discipline, which I call political demography, had to wait until 1981 to be thought out due to the shortage of information on population problems.

### Sacrificing The Future

The same conclusion can be reached from studying social welfare financing. The development of social benefits and the changes brought to the regulation over the past 30 years are characterized by a true social setback at all levels.

The social benefits issue has already been discussed, particularly in "Wrinkled France" (by Gérard-François Dumont et al, Collection Pluriel, 1979). The non-revalorization of family benefits in view of the inflation; the cancellation of measures upholding the worth of mothers of large families; the establishment of ceilings creating injustice due to the consequences of the cut-off point; the lack of adaptation of family benefits to a more urban society in which the professional work of women has assumed another function; and the establishment of a property requirement to vote in the elections of the administrators of social security and family benefits funds; all of these factors show a complete failure to recognize the demographic impact of errors in the social welfare policy. To sacrifice long-term results for current ones is a biased governmental attitude.

As it stands, the future, that is to say, the child, the human investment, demands a monetary effort. An INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] survey, entitled "An Approach to the Cost of Children," confirmed what we had announced. Two researchers calculated "the additional expenses which a family must incur to benefit from the same living standard as a childless couple." They started with an average of 9,960 francs in monthly expenses for a childless couple. Taking taxes into account, they estimated the additional expenses to be 1,860 francs per month, per child; 3,420 francs for two children; and 5,470 francs for three.

This simple method brings to light the necessity to compensate for family expenses, for children are a source of expenses as well as happiness. One cannot be dissociated from the other.

Another essential factor concerning the other family budget should be added. There is a financial budget and there is a time budget. The latter should not be left out. This supposes a complete revision of how family expenses should be taken into account. This calls for a complete revamping of the family benefits system in order to redefine it on the basis of family contributions to the community.

The economist knows that an expensive asset is rare. Because they cost a lot in money, time, organization of life and housing in a country which has always favored Malthusian housing policies, children are becoming scarce when many French people are anxious to welcome more. The legislator should revise all laws which discourage having children. As it stands, there is an unfortunate tendency to favor the rights acquired by living men and installed by the electors of today at the expense of the future represented by the children. The decision-makers who want to quell the economic crisis should, in the absence of feelings, remember at least that children represent a stimulus to investment and consumption.

#### The Fourth Factor

Forgetting this reality is also the result of a methodological inadequacy as mentioned in "Demographie Politique" ("Political Demography" by Alfred Sauvy, Gérard-François Dumont and Bernard Merigot, Economica and Editions of the APRD, 1982). There is a huge lag between concepts and reality. There remains a refusal to study realities on an interdisciplinary basis. Let us take for example the conflicts--open wars, cold wars or balance of force--disrupting the world by applying pressure through various means, including terrorism. The media stress, and rightly so, the ideological importance of these conflicts, without always explaining, it must be added, the foundations or the methods of their underlying ideologies. Who, for example, explains to the public the bases of Leninist thought? Who explains the difficulty of free countries to fight totalitarianism by refusing to use totalitarian methods?

The conflicts, however, must be viewed on four levels: Ideologic, which is often nothing more than the means of a ruling minority to assume, maintain or strengthen its power; historic, which makes it possible to understand the grudges rooted in the people's collective memories and liable to surface any time under more or less aggressive forms; geographic, which partially explains both the Poles' and the Afghans' current sufferings and past wars between Rome and Carthage; and demographic, which makes it possible to touch on population structures and take into account the human factor as both individual will and part of a collective force.

To omit one of these factors is equivalent to refusing to observe and understand developments. How can a population fail to see the relationship between implicitly rejecting the future through a lower birth rate and accepting the domination of another people? Two parallel behaviors are indeed at play here: One consists in accepting decline through demographic decline and the other, in accepting to live permanently under the stronger people's sword of Damocles. "Better Red than dead," is nothing more than "The arguments of the strongest are always the best." How can dismantled Pershings capable of defending your lifestyle and your democracy be feared without once talking about the SS20 missiles that can destroy in one second, without the possibility of resisting, everything which you hold dear? (Press commentaries mentioned that it had been the case, for example, during the large-scale October 1983 demonstration in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany].)



There are four explanations for this phenomenon of collective rejection. The opponent uses the means set up by a particularly efficient ideology to apply pressure on the target country. This country is geographically at the forefront of a possible military attack. It was divided by history thus clouding its people's perception of themselves as a nation and therefore their concept of national independence. It also had such an aggressive behavior two generations ago that it fears the possible awakening of its violent temperament, as though it wanted to expiate its misuse of force in the past with an attitude of self-denial and indulgence in its current weakness. Finally, this attitude of self-retirement is rightly a corollary of deep-seated Malthusian demographic behaviors.

Thus, when the development of societies is studied, it is imperative to remember to use demographic, as well as other, methods in order to try to understand. Three different examples were used to make our point: Immigration in France, social welfare and the so-called "pacifist" attitude of the FRG.

Demography is often forgotten, however, for its effects are slow in showing. A generation, or 30 years, is demography's unit of work. Political demography requires the ability to see beyond everyday life and to make the effort of thinking about tomorrow by considering pertinent facts. Who, however, can see pertinent facts? For example, which of the media wrote that the large number of young immigrants in some schools was the result of the lower birthrate among French women? Which of the media wrote that the economic development potential of the FRG could be limited due to the annual drop in its population of approximately 200,000 inhabitants, the result of a higher number of deaths than births? Which of the media showed that a lower birthrate is an exacerbating factor of unemployment?

It would be possible to raise many more questions of this type concerning China, Lebanon or retirement benefits. All of this shows how important it is to develop this new interdisciplinary approach, which I called Political Demography in 1981. The purpose of this science is to deal with interdependent relationships between population problems and overall urban problems (whence the name SIDP, Interdisciplinary Seminar of Political Demography, under Alfred Sauvy's chairmanship, which, together with Bernard Merigot, I head at the College of France).

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## POTENTIAL RESULTS OF MARCHAIS' AFRICAN TRIP ANALYZED

Paris AUTRES MONDES in French 7 Nov 83 pp 3-5

[Text] On 20 October, a PCF [French Communist Party] delegation led by Georges Marchais, the party's secretary General, began a 10-day African trip. Three stopovers were planned: Angola, Congo and Benin. The choice of these three countries was in itself a confirmation, were it needed, of the international alignment of the French communists. On his first major African excursion in April 1980, Georges Marchais, characteristically, visited Madagascar and Mozambique. Each time, he has visited the countries that to one extent or another appeared to have chosen the road to socialism and to alignment with the overall objectives of Soviet foreign policy.

This African jaunt is of interest not only to the countries concerned and to the international communist movement. It must be examined from the standpoint of PS [(French) Socialist Party]/PCF relations in France, certainly from that of the Government's foreign policy, but also from that of its implications within France itself. The impact of the contacts Georges Marchais is renewing will have an enduring effect, and the full extent of their consequences will make itself felt only gradually. The Place Fabien delegation has undertaken its diplomatic junket at a crucial moment, since all of France's positions in Africa--its political, economic and military policies there--will be at issue in 1984 in connection with the evolution of the Chadian question.

## Marchais's General African Line of Attack

On 29 October, at Cotonou, in Benin, Georges Marchais wound up his series of meetings and surveyed his overall results. The communist leader's African stage setting was not very complicated. The African peoples are confronted by "immense problems." The cause of these lies in:

- 1) "a past of colonial exploitation and oppression"; and
- 2) "a present effort on the part of imperialism to perpetuate, in one form or another, that prior situation."

This language could not have displeased the three African dictators who received the visit of the French communists. Nothing that goes wrong, nothing that fails to progress, can be blamed on the local leaders. Yesterday's colonialism and today's imperialism are solely to blame. In two of the three countries he visited--the Congo and Benin--Georges Marchais placed the blame squarely on France. In Benin, he recalled "the mercenaries operation, mounted by the Giscardian special services to try to overthrow the revolutionary government," in 1977. In this regard, he might well have evoked the French communist investigative reporters' active cooperation with Benin's intelligence services, so as to identify the real or presumed participants in this cooperation (the Rennes communist lawyer, Claude Larzul, was, among other things, deeply involved in this matter).

The PCF's secretary general alluded to the "ostracism with regard to countries whose choice of societal system was not to the liking of the previous French rightist governments." Here, his statement was somewhat hazardous, since one need only mention in this regard the recent record of relations between Brazzaville and Paris or the supplying of French military equipment to Angola, well before May 1981.

The past being so totally reprehensible, the future could not be other than better, above all if the solution being advocated by international expert Georges Marchais is adopted: "As for this African soil, I repeat with even greater force, if that is possible: It is time, it is high time, to devote to the developing countries the sums being devoured by this frightening armaments race which is threatening to reduce the planet to nothing." To ensure that such a devout expression of faith would not fall without immediate effect on inattentive ears, Georges Marchais added: "For our part, we have reiterated to all our interlocutors that cooperation, as viewed by the PCF, must be based on uncompromising respect for independence and sovereignty, that it must permit the establishment of relations based on equality and justice, excluding all discrimination and all subordination..." The French government not having been mentioned in this statement of principle, one is led to conclude from this that the PCF, the PS and the head of the government have differing views... The communist leader, however, has something concrete to offer the African countries in the way of aid: "This is the very concept being embodied for us in the renewal of the Lome Convention; we are, in particular, stating our support for an increase in the funding to be made available under this Convention, and for an improvement of the mechanism that guarantees the member countries stability of exchange rates in relation to their production." Thus, the sole means the PCF has for demonstrating its sincerity to the Africans is the EEC [European Economic Community], an organization against which the communists fought tooth and nail, and which they have always considered a creation of imperialism. Even more: They have deemed the EEC to be an organization for neocolonial exploitation; which, however, does not prevent them today from positing their participation in it as beneficial...

## PCF's Political Aims

Vague though he is in his statements on the development of cooperation, Georges Marchais knows, however, exactly what he wants to achieve from a political standpoint. He condemns the Union of South Africa without appeal and demands "that France break off the relations it maintains with South Africa. Some initial steps have been taken in this regard, and they must be followed by others..."

While for this objective the PCF operates mainly as a pressure group inside and outside the government, it also operates directly: "It (the PCF) develops militant solidarity with the liberation movements of the Namibian and South African peoples, the SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] and the ANC [African National Congress]."

In addition to Namibia, Georges Marchais concerns himself with Angola. In his view, the Union of South Africa "equips and provides training and experienced staffing to the armed groups of the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]." There is an urgent need "to apply the Security Council's Resolution 435 providing for Namibia's accession to independence, and to "constrain" South Africa "to withdraw its troops from Angola." On the other hand, one does not have the right to establish an "artificial link" between this problem and the stationing of Angola's Cuban military units. This Cuban presence, in fact, is the result of a sovereign act of the Angolan government, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations."

The southern part of Africa is not alone in vying for the attention of geopolitician Marchais. "In the Western Sahara," he urges "direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front, leading to a cease-fire and to the organizing of a referendum." And, above all, in Chad, he calls for "a political settlement of the conflict." What needs to be done is to follow "the recommendations that call for negotiations between the Chadian factions, a cease-fire and the departure of foreign troops." That is, for the withdrawal of the French armed forces. Insofar as accelerating this withdrawal is concerned, the French communists are not lacking in means of action in France.

On the whole, the general outlook appears promising to Georges Marchais. He pays tribute to "the changes that have taken place in this region of Africa, with the participation of the peoples concerned, in Ghana and in Upper Volta." His doffing of his cap to these two reinforced military dictatorships is a telltale indication, and not by any means one of the least, of the real friendships and aims of their two leaders.

## The PCF Delegation

The general aims of the PCF are one thing; their feasibility is another. Georges Marchais did not leave alone for Africa. Three other members of the

Central Committee accompanied him. Maxime Gremetz, as head of the PCF's Foreign Policy Section, had to go along as a matter of course. Claude Cabanes went along to provide the trip's required journalistic impact. As the number two of L'HUMANITE DIMANCHE, he was given the task of organizing the vast propaganda operation planned for the return. His presence attests to Georges Marchais's intent to maximize the memorableness of his 10 African days, which should provide food for thought to the president of the Republic, who, theoretically, is responsible for French foreign policy. Jean-Francois Gau, at age 34, is one of the little-known but highly effective talents of the PCF. It turns out he was a member of the delegation of French communists who, on 11 and 12 July 1983, in Moscow, met with Yuri Andropov, secretary general of the USSR's Communist Party. The latter was, among other things, flanked by his foreign affairs expert on France, Vadim Zagladine. On 23 October, in Paris, Vadim Zagladine publicly hailed the success of this meeting. But the three musketeers were in reality four. L'HUMANITE had neglected, at the start of the trip, to mention that Roger Trugnan, a colleague in the PCF's Foreign Affairs Section, was a member of the delegation. The three joint press releases (which could not very well be truncated) mention him. Roger Trugnan is a past master of contacts with revolutionary movements, including illegal ones (he has, moreover, had personal experience in this respect, having joined the PCF in 1940, when the latter was dissolved because of its approval of the Hitler-Stalin Pact).

#### The Angolan Stop

Georges Marchais went to Angola at the invitation of its president, Eduardo Dos Santos. He had a 4-hour meeting with the chief of state. At Luanda, Georges Marchais also met with leaders of the SWAPO, the Namibian insurrection movement, which is warring against South Africa. Dramatically, the French communists traveled to the Namibian border. On 24 October, they visited a Renault 4 assembly plant on the outskirts of Luanda, then took part in a mass meeting, and signed a cooperation agreement with the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] Angolan Workers Party, which calls itself Marxist-Leninist.

At Luanda, Georges Marchais said principally that "France can and must grant privileged aid to Angola as well as to the other front-line countries" (against South Africa). Curiously, the Angolan leaders with whom the PCF met included Juliao Matemos Paulo, who is not only secretary of his party's Central Committee for Defense and Security but also minister of state security... On the eve of his departure from Luanda, at the official dinner, the ambassador of France "and his closest associates" included Georges Marchais and his assistants.

#### Marchais Received Like a Chief of State

In the Congo, at Brazzaville, the chief of state, Denis Sassou N'Guesso, personally met the French comrades "at the foot of the plane's passenger debarkation steps" (L'HUMANITE, 26 October).



Georges Marchais and N'Guesso together reviewed the troops, and the French ambassador was there to greet the PCF delegation. Thus, it was in the style normally reserved for a president of the Republic that the secretary general of the PCF was received, with the crowd massed along the way. This did not prevent him from carrying out his duties as a communist, since "During his visit to the farming enterprise at Siafoumou, near Pointe-Noire... some French communist cooperation officials handed Georges Marchais a small white envelope. It contained 300 francs. For a subscription to L'HUMANITE!" At Pointe-Noire, the welcome accorded to the communist leader reached some of its highest points with "lycee students chanting revolutionary slogans (those of the Karl Marx Lycee had a particularly determined air about them)..."

At the French ambassador's residence, Georges Marchais expressed his deep thanks for the reception accorded him and the "hundred thousand Congolese" who welcomed him "in a highly enthusiastic din" at Brazzaville. A memorandum of agreement was signed between the PCT [Congolese Labor Party] and the PCF. At their departure, the Congolese president was again at the foot of the steps of the plane that was to carry away his French guests.

In Benin, the level of the environment was not the same. But there also, a welcome (and televised embrace) by the chief of state, Mathieu Kerekou, and an official greeting by the French ambassador. An agreement was signed between parties. At Brazzaville, his meetings were termed "warm and friendly," indeed "brotherly"; those at Luanda were described as having taken place "in an atmosphere of warm friendliness"; those at Cotonou, it was stated, took place "in a climate of /trust [printed in boldface]/ and warm friendliness." It is somewhat surprising that what presumably should have been taken for granted needed to be reported.

Even though his Beninese sojourn was not orchestrated in the same key as his other two stops (its touristic aspects were markedly more evident), Georges Marchais can feel satisfied. On the African political scene, he took positions that official French diplomacy will not be able to skirt. The startling public positions taken by him on the continent's pressing problems are going to leave imprints that will not be easily effaced by the Elysee's emissaries, certain of whom, after all, are not far removed in their views from those of Georges Marchais (R. Debray's visit to Angola has not been forgotten, from this standpoint, by certain foreign offices). The PCF is openly influencing the formulation of African policy by the government, without the latter being able to distance itself, on site, from the communist statements and thus unveiling contradictions. In the immediate future--and the visit to the Renault plant at Luanda is very revealing in this respect--the PCF (and the CGT [General Confederation of Labor], whose international sector cooperates uninterruptedly with the communists' Foreign Policy Section) will be applying all-out pressure, at all levels, from the government down to COFACE [French Foreign Trade Insurance Company], for the negotiation of trade agreements with Angola, Benin and Congo.

(1) [as published] Regarding specific PCF means (for example, AFASPA, see AUTRES MONDES, No.2, 6 October 1983: "The PCF and Africa."

## PCF ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA, AMONG IMMIGRANTS NOTED

Paris AUTRES MONDES in French 6 Oct 83 pp 3-4

[Article: "The PCF and Africa"]

[Text] A study of how Georges Marchais's party conducts its own foreign policy, with made-to-order instruments.

The entire press picked up the release by the PCF [French Communist Party] announcing that its secretary general, Georges Marchais, was going to visit Africa at the head of a delegation of his party, from 20 to 30 October 1983. His planned itinerary will take him to Benin, Angola and Congo. The media added practically nothing to this announcement. Shortly afterwards, on the occasion of Congolese President Denis Sassou N'Guesso's official visit to France, Marchais himself indicated that he "attached exceptional importance to the trip he will be making" to Africa. "I will have the opportunity to explain the PCF's positions, the ideas and proposals we are advocating in response to the expectations and aspirations of the African peoples." This statement contained little of anything concrete and, the secretary general of the PCF being perceived as being not very knowledgeable regarding African climates, it is not hard to imagine the delegation from Place Fabien doing little more than communicating what any African could find in L'HUMANITE, REVOLUTION, or CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME.

Actually, a more precise idea can be had as to the "exceptional" importance of Georges Marchais's African jaunt by referring to the problems addressed by him during his 22 September meeting with the Congolese president. "The Chadian problem, South African aggressiveness, problems of underdevelopment..." In his view, the many-sided Chadian problem alone warrants African talks, and there can be little doubt that Georges Marchais will offer the head of state, Francois Mitterrand, the benefit of the information he will gather. It is true that the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the French Embassies exist precisely and solely for the purpose of keeping the government informed and that one would thus be tempted to see this as a superfluous PCF junket, barely profitable to the party alone. But this would be not to take into account the specialized machinery of the communists, which provides them an ongoing flow of information that is perhaps superior to that of government officials.

The PCF has a Foreign Policy Section, known in the party's jargon by the acronym POLEX. This communist Quai d'Orsay is staffed by tens of very high level fellow-workers. The African branch of POLEX (which is headed by Maxime Gremetz) is staffed by well-known university faculty members and by experienced specialists from the various countries. As regards French-speaking Africa, the PCF has in its ranks veterans who were either born in those countries or have lived in them for a very long time. These "old-timers" have fought against "French colonialism" and have reliable friends in the capitals of the states that have emerged from the former French Union. As far back as when there was an Assembly of Union Counsellors, the PCF had in it numerous and active representative. It also helped create local communist parties and liberation movements, and its abysmal failure in Algeria, during the 1954-1962 war there, does not really blur its modest successes elsewhere. Louis Odru, Elie Mignot, Martin Verlet, J. Suret-Canale, among a flock of others, have for a very long time been following or are now following African problems very closely.

POLEX's specialists and the "African race and language specialists" of the CGT's [General Confederation of Labor('s)] International Relations Department work together perfectly, lending each other a hand as a team. Generation renewal is provided by way of the MJCF [French Communist Youth Movement] which trains replacements at the level of its international activities, particularly within the UEC [Union of Communist Students]. Besides keeping exhaustive files on each country updated, the members of POLEX's staff write for the party press and prepare African trips for the leaders of the PCF, as well as the reception of officials of African communist parties who visit France. Its bilateral relations are many: When Georges Marchais met with the president of the Congo, he was only meeting with him again. The two leaders had already met in Paris in July 1981. The Congolese minister of foreign affairs, who was present at both Marchais/N'Guesso meetings in 1981 and 1983, had previously visited the PCF headquarters in September 1979. The meeting "took place in a friendly and brotherly atmosphere." In February 1982, he attended the PCF's 24th Congress. In July 1980, "a general agreement on cooperation" was signed between the PCT [Congolese Labor Party] and the PCF, the MJCF named a representative to the congress of the Congolese Socialist Youth, and so forth... This sequence was identical for almost all the African countries.

The PCF makes use only of direct approaches. It has at its disposal the labor network: First of all, its contacts with the French CGT, then with representatives of the WFTU [World Federation of Trade Unions], and Labor International, whose headquarters is in Prague and which is oriented toward the USSR. Most of the staff of the WFTU in French-speaking Africa is made up of Frenchmen, members of the PCF and of the CGT, which makes things easier. Through the CGT and the WFTU, the PCF maintains relations with the OATUU [Organization of African Trade Union Unity]. It can also operate through the SPF [French Popular Relief], a grass-roots organization for charitable works, headed by communist leader Julien Laupretre. The SPF is present in several African countries and actively supports the Polisario Front in its war against Morocco.



The fact of the matter is that the PCF has forged for itself a made-to-order structure for operating in Africa, without its own presence being immediately detectable. It is the AFASPA [French Association for Friendship and Solidarity with African Peoples], a designation that cannot have other than an agreeable sound to African ears.

The AFASPA surfaced in 1973 and its articles of association range from the struggle against racism to economic, social and cultural developmental aid. No quid pro quo is asked of the Africans. Initially sheltered by the CGT (from 1973 to 1978), the AFASPA next installed in Montreuil (Seine-Saint-Denis). Of its seven presidents, not less than five, initially, were communists, one of whom, Rene Piquet, was a member of the Political Bureau, and two, Louis Odru and J. Suret-Canale, were specialists mentioned above. The Association's secretary general, Claude Gatignon, who comes from a long-time communist family, is head of the Communist Party in Argenteuil (Val-d'Oise), and travels a great deal to represent the AFASPA. With premises located at 9, Place Jean-Jaures, Montreuil (93), Claude Gatignon publishes a swank quarterly magazine AUJOURD'HUI L'AFRIQUE. AFASPA has shown itself to be an instrument well suited to the PCF's policy--and to that of the USSR--in the case of Somalia. The Association maintains excellent relations with that country, at a very time when Ethiopia--an ally of the Kremlin--enters into conflict with its Somalian neighbor.

The PCF knows that Africa starts at Paris, and does not neglect to gather information among the immigrants from the different countries. Active in organizations for the elimination of illiteracy, it has succeeded in recruiting many Africans in the last few years. Its efforts among the African foreigners associations represent a very long-term investment, and it is quite possible that very shortly, in Upper Volta, these efforts will prove not to have been fruitless for the PCF. Here again, the CGT, SPF and others re-double, when they do not totally replace, the PCF's approaches. During several labor conflicts (for example, Talbot-Poissy), the progress of CGT influence on the Mauritians has made itself dramatically felt.

At the PCF's 24th Congress (February 1982), the following African parties and movements were represented:

- ANC [African National Congress] (South Africa);
- Angolan FLN-PT [National Liberation Front-Labor Party];
- PRPB [People's Revolution Party of Lenin];
- PAICV [African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde];
- Central African FPO-PT [Ubangi Patriotic Front-Labor Party];
- National Front-Union of Comorians;
- PCT;
- Egyptian Communist Party;

- National Progressivist Unionist Party for the Rallying of Egypt;
- Ethiopian Workers Party Steering Committee;
- Democratic Party of Guinea;
- African Party for the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde;
- General Congress of the People of Libya;
- Madagascar's FNDR [National Front for the Defense of the Revolution];
- Malian Front for Revolution and Democracy;
- Morocco's PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism];
- FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front];
- Namibia's SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization];
- Nigerian Working People's Socialist Party
- Polisario Front (Western Sahara);
- Senegal's PIT [Party for Independence and Labor];
- Sudanese Communist Party;
- FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front];
- Democratic National Union of Chad;
- PCT [Tunisian Communist Party].

Twenty-six organizations from 24 countries. The observers, at the time of this congress, were impressed by the high level of the foreign delegations and concluded from it that a party in government was being accorded more consideration than an opposition organization. Of course. The attraction was reciprocal: The French communist ministers gave a great deal of their attention and each in his own sector oriented French policy toward gradual implementation of the PCF's objectives, and more generally the objectives of the International Communist Movement, which is headed by the USSR. A comparison of statements by the PCF with those of the Soviet Union's Communist Party with regard to African problems is revealing in this respect. A forthcoming article will discuss this complementarity in more detail, as well as the practical effects, insofar as concerns Africa, of the control of certain ministries by the communists.

As for Georges Marchais's trip, however, one certainty is already clear as of now: He will not be able to use the same language he did during his March-April 1980 junket, when, in his remarks to several African governments, he denounced "French imperialism in Africa and the Indian Ocean." The form will certainly change. As for content, it will have to be examined carefully. Africa is going to weigh heavily in French policy-making from all standpoints in the months ahead. Concurrences and divergences between the PCF and the PS [(French) Socialist Party], as to the future of this continent, will have an "exceptional bearing."

## UMBRELLA YOUTH GROUP CNAJEP DOMINATED BY PCF-CGT

Paris AUTRES MONDES in French 26 Dec 83 p 14

[Article: "The CNAJEP: Another Trojan Horse?"]

[Text] The Committee for National and International Relations of the Youth and Popular Education Associations--the CNAJEP--is an organization with some hundred full-fledged member associations (it also has three observer members). The CNAJEP claims to provide coordinative representation on all questions concerning youth policy. It sits on the High Commission for Leisure-Time Social Activities, the High Commission for Youth Matters, and on ministerial committees for youth matters, and is thus in permanent official contact with the government authorities, whom it is capable of influencing. Internationally, the CNAJEP participates in the European Communities Youth Forum, and on the European Council of National Youth Commissions on "Youth" matters before the Council of Europe. It also participates in the activities of the Pan-European Cooperation of Youth and Students, an outgrowth of the Helsinki Conference, and in the French Committee for UNESCO. And it will be part of the French delegation to the UN General Assembly.

The CNAJEP aims to author a youth policy; it seeks to "defend and promote associative activity," and to achieve recognition of "the social and cultural role of the youth and popular education associations." Its vast goals warrant detailed discussion. First, it should be noted that the CNAJEP, created in 1968 and presided by Mr Alain Barrau, has its headquarters at 30, rue Cabanis, 75014 Paris, and that it receives ministerial subsidies. Its membership includes:

- CCJ-CGT [Youth Confederative Organization-General Confederation of Labor];
- FSGT [Labor Federation for Sports and Gymnastics];
- FNTEC [National Federation for Work and Culture], also known as T and C;
- LVJ [Youth Leisure Time and Vacations];
- MJCF [French Communist Youth Movement];
- PDF [French Pioneers];

--T and T [Tourism and Work];

--UFF [Union of French Women];

--UNEF [Union of French Students], also known as Solidarity.

All of these associations are substructures of the PCF or of the CGT, or grass-roots organizations controlled by one or the other of these. Political organizations other than the MJCF (for example, the MJS [Socialist Youth Movement] and the MJRG [Leftist Radical Youth Movement]) are represented in the CNAJEP, but not a single association either closely or remotely connected with an opposition movement is to be found in it.

On the other hand, strongly-communist-influenced organizations in the CNAJEP are numerous (for example, the FFMJC [French Federation of Youth and Cultural Centers]).

It is therefore not the least bit surprising that the CNAJEP merely echoes, loudly and clearly, the platforms of the PCF with regard to youth and popular education. L'HUMANITE of 2 December devoted a great deal of space to the CNAJEP's concerns with respect to the 1984 budget of the Ministry for Leisure-Time, Youth and Sports Activities, under the eloquent heading: "Youth - An Insufficient 1984 Budget." The comments by the CNAJEP's president, transcribed by L'HUMANITE, are severe with regard to the government. He takes issue with the failure of the "non-priority nature of the Leisure-Time budget" to conform to "Candidate Mitterrand's 101 propositions" relating to a charter for the people's representatives. The CNAJEP does not stop at criticizing the government; it also attacks the opposition: Alain Barrau condemned "the systematic policy of revenge, of which the associative movement is a victim, on the part of certain rightist municipal government groups, particularly those elected last March."

The amalgamative vocabulary and methods characterizing the above quotes attest to the dominative aims of the CNAJEP. During its assembly of 18 November, the CNAJEP took under advisement the International Youth Year-1985 to be sponsored by the United Nations. The CNAJEP "does not conceive of this event as being the occasion for a few experts to delve into youth questions, " but, on the contrary, "a forward stride toward evaluation of the significant actions and progress realized in this domain, and one that will permit meaningful and real intervention by youth in societal life." Seeking to understand the concrete meaning of this phrasing, an official of the youth movement asked the CNAJEP representatives for an explanation. In reply, he was told that what it means specifically is a study of the possibilities of a commitment to the struggle for peace and disarmament. A concern that is dear to the hearts of the Soviets and of the PCF.

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CSO: 3519/336

## PAPANDREOU SEEN BECOMING MORE LEFTIST, ANTI-WEST

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 21 Apr 84 pp 1, 3

/Article by Nikos Nikolaou/

/Text/ The possibility that Center Array /PARKE/ Chairman G. Mavros may head the PASOK ticket for the Euroelection does not mean that the foreign policy orientation of the government is becoming more pro-European. This is simply a tactical maneuver by A. Papandreou, designed to attract once again the centrist voters. In fact, the government's anti-Western sloganeering is put together more systematically and wears a more socialist cap since, following the student elections /Papandreou/, has begun to believe seriously that he can offset his decline by taking votes away from the communist left.

Because developments have their own dynamism which goes beyond the intentions of the leadership, the leftward turn of PASOK will not be limited to resounding slogans. The bill on farm cooperatives, the measures against commerce and the Arsenis arrangements concerning the problem enterprises signal a dangerous course toward an autocratic statism which increasingly pushes the private initiative into the corner.

This is the assessment of reliable economic circles, based on reports that the PASOK strategists are currently aiming at garnering the 10 extra points gained in the 1981 Euroelection by KKE, KKE-Int., and the Party of Democratic Socialism /KODISO/.

KODISO, of course, is not an easy target, especially since its chairman's consistently democratic and liberal line has created among its followers strong beliefs which may lead to shifts toward the right rather than to the left.

But the electoral cooks of PASOK believe the "select" voters for the Eurotickets of the two communist parties can be easily won over through a well-organized propaganda focusing on the danger of a "return of the Right" on one side and on the other on a bold and extreme sloganeering which will minimize the ideological and political differences between the dogmatic and the Third World socialism.

The Objectives of the Plan



Specifically, /Papandreou/ and especially his election general staff, headed by Minister of Interior Menios Koutsogiorgas, seem to consider as sure the return to the "New Democracy" of its own voters and of a large segment of the centrist voters who in 1981 voted for PASOK. To arrest these unfavorable prospects the selected tactic provides for the following:

1. Placing at the top of the PASOK ticket a personality able to dispel the fear that the government may move on to changes which may jeopardize the present complex of the country's alliances and international relations and which may overturn the system of free economy internally. G. Mavros, with his record and struggles, has shown that he believes our country must not leave NATO or the EEC and even more does not even discuss a change of the existing socioeconomic system. He cooperated with A. Papandreou in 1981 precisely because he wanted to hold him back from extreme actions.

But if in 1981 the exploitation of the "asset" Mavros by PASOK proved productive, now it is unlikely it will be very beneficial, after the experience of the last 30 months and since now the reliability of the government's maneuvering is zero. Indeed, who has forgotten a similar case with George Papandreou as the hero? It is known that when in 1944 Siantos proposed to G. Papandreou to assume the leadership of EAM, he refused the offer by saying he was afraid he was not going "to be the head but rather the headdress" of the organization.

2. Rekindling the constant worry of the communist left about a return of police persecution, PASOK cheaply exploits this fear and worry, trying to entrap the politically less mature masses in the communist parties, especially in the provinces, raising the specter of the Right, saying that the return of the Right means a return of police files, persecutions, dismissals, and imprisonment.

In the 1981 Euroelection KKE won 12.84 percent of the votes compared to 10.9 percent in the national election; and KKE-Int. 5.26 percent in the Euroelection and 1.34 in the national election. There is, therefore, an extra portion of six points which the PASOK cooks ogle hungrily, imagining they can turn it to 10 percent, thus offsetting the certain decline of the governing party. And they count the beans while the polarization is orchestrated from above!

#### Socialists and Communists

However, the possibilities that this second maneuver will succeed are going down daily, since the followers and the cadres of the communist left who are the first to pay with sacrifices and struggles for any anti-democratic regime (they are the ones who flood the jails and the exile camps while the belated socialists from abroad flood the American universities and the European capitals) already started to worry and to denounce the political tension caused by PASOK and the spirit of division which for the first time since 1974 is being revived in the countryside.

Moreover, the cadres of the communist left know that the spirit of national unity and the consolidation of the democratic institutions secured after 1974 by the present president of the Republic, have made the Communist Party an inseparable and functional element of our democratic regime.

A return of the Right to old methods is now impossible! After all, this is the rule throughout the free world. "Right" leaders like Thatcher or Kohl not only have made no distinctions against the communists, they have not even thought of doing so. On the contrary, in all the countries of Third World socialism, the communists are being persecuted, imprisoned or murdered. It is not just a coincidence that all "the brothers in socialism" of A. Papandreou, from Qadhafi to Saddam Hussein and from Assad to Arafat have dipped their hands in the blood of communists!

#### The EEC

Of course the pre-electoral campaign will be waged on the full record and will not be limited, as it should, on the question of membership or on European unification. In this context the government will certainly slide increasingly to anti-Western positions while EEC will be set daily as the target of the PASOK dogmatists.

The group of the anti-EEC ministers (Arsenis, Vaitzos, etc.) will apparently be strengthened after Easter with the addition of Professor Triandis, a personal friend of A. Papandreou and may be destined to become minister of finance. Triandis retired from a university in Canada and was appointed counsellor at the Bank of Greece. According to certain government circles Papandreou has selected him as a successor to Arsenis in the event an electoral failure of PASOK on 17 June will necessitate the identification of a scapegoat!

It is noted that Triandis always opposed the induction into the EEC. In 1965 he published through the Center for Planning and Economic Research a study with the title, "The Common Market and Greece's Economic Development," in which he argued that Greece could not benefit from participation in the Common Market because of its geographic location and the poverty of the underground resources!

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CSO: 3521/241

## LAWYERS ASSOCIATION ELECTION MASKS ND-PASOK BATTLE

Athens OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek No 1561, 5 Apr 84 pp 47-48

[Text] It is presumed that every electoral body votes for a simple correlation of the action towards a given objective: in presidential elections, the one the voter believes to be the best for the office; in parliamentary elections, the party which he would like to see gain the majority and form the government; etc. At the same time, it is supposed (without ever being mentioned, of course) that various experts on electoral matters can forge the appropriate electoral systems that channel this naive "electoral behavior" (voting behavior) of the "masses" towards the sought-after result.

However, the voting "masses" are not as naive as the experts would like them to be and the Greeks are even less so with such a high standing of politicization (see article in OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS No. 7/1984 of Koinotikon [Community] and in ANTITHESEIS No. 11, my article "The Problem of the Press"). Thus, for instance in 1958, a great majority of the voters who voted for EDA [United Democratic Left], did not vote to give it the majority and to form a government. They did not even over-vote; by voting for EDA they voted against an attempt to introduce a two-party system in Greece by programming as a "second" party a coalition of opportunity by S. Venizelos and G. Papandreou, who a short time before had opposed each other vehemently. I would even say that some voters, with an especially complex stance, voted for EDA because they had no fear that it could obtain a majority and form a government.

When the man on the street in Greece can handle his voting privileges with such finesse, it would be ridiculous for one to expect a naive "voting behavior" in the Athens Bar Association (DSA).

It must be emphasized, in reference to this, that the DSA elections had political significance, both in 1981 and in 1984, in view of the fact that the majority of the candidates for the presidency and most tickets for member of the council were directly connected with their political orientation or, at least, with their support of political parties. Under circumstances such as these, even a single non-political vote based strictly on union criteria, took on a political nuance in view of the fact that it necessarily meant the rejection of the political character of the elections and, indirectly, of the political parties as well, a fact that gave it a political connotation. Under a more charitable interpretation, it could be said that the vote, independent of any party ties, meant that the voter had not

been sufficiently active in a party in order to cast his vote according to the dictates of said party. To a great degree these matters are surely responsible for the abstentions and the null and void ballots.

The political significance of the DSA though cannot be found by simply "reading" the results because there have been political combinations, both in 1981 and in 1984. Thus, before we interpret politically the voting, we must first find it as the basis of certain reasonings.

The analysis of these votes by party illustrates, more or less, the following picture (the reasoning that underlies the analysis will follow):

In February of 1981, 4,000 Athens attorneys, who were to vote and voted for PASOK in the October 1981 parliamentary elections, were divided as follows: 2,917 voted for the party's choice, Ev. Giannopoulos; 73, for the exponent of an opposing view within PASOK, V. Pondikopoulos; 1,000 voted for the KKE candidate, Ev. Makhairas, and 10 voted otherwise. Thus, Ev. Makhairas, by obtaining 1,500 KKE votes, 702 of the KKE (interior), 60 of the Far Left and the 1,000 of PASOK, collected 3,262 votes.

In 1984, the attorneys voted as follows: 2,000 voted for the candidate of the PASOK/KKE front, Mr. Makhairas; 978, for the independents, Mourikis and Kalligas; 122 voted for the Center, KODISO [Democratic Socialism Party] or KKE (Interior) and 900 votes went to ND's Zafeiropoulos. Thus, Makhairas, by obtaining the 2,000 PASOK votes and the 1,502 of the KKE, remained at 3,502, while Zafeiropoulos, by winning 2,399 of those who in 1981 had voted for Mbrinias (302 voted for the far rightist, Xydopoulos), the 900 of PASOK and the majority of those who had voted for Dernitsiotis as well as from the remaining voters, obtained 3,993 votes.

The figuring, based on the 4,000 PASOK voters in October 1981, is broken down as follows: a) the ratio 4,000/9,518, therefore, 42/100, comes close to the electoral results of the 1981 parliamentary elections and there is no indication that the attorneys of Athens deviated much more; b) if the KKE had more than 1,500 votes in the DSA then, in the 1984 elections, it would have elected more council members than PASOK, while the multiple choice ballot favored the more cohesive party organization over the less tightly-knit one. It is, however, widely known that the KKE has a better political organization than PASOK. Therefore, the fact that PASOK elected more council members than the KKE cannot otherwise be explained except by the 2,000 PASOK-1,500 KKE vote ratio (better possibility for the KKE). However, if the KKE has 1,500 attorneys' votes in Athens in 1984 and the KKE (Interior), 713, there is no reason for us to believe that they had more in 1981 (on the contrary, as a matter of fact, with the then PASOK ascendancy).

Based on the above analysis of the votes, and only if this analysis is accepted as being correct, the interpretation of this vote can follow and certain "trends" can be perceived, as PASOK president, Mr. Papandreou, appropriately demanded. (If, on the contrary, other figures were submitted, for instance, that in 1981, 3,000 KKE voters voted for Makhairas, for whom they again voted in 1984, or went over to the opposition, then other interpretations must be given).

The first deduction which asserts itself is that, at least as far as the Athens attorneys are concerned, the electoral basis of PASOK is highly unstable (27 percent went over to the opposition in 1981 and 50 percent in 1984). This should not appear strange if one considers that PASOK rose in the political firmament like a comet: when a party comes to power only 7 years after its founding, it would be utopian for one to expect it to have greater stability.

However, the instability by itself does not tell us much. We must, at the same time, examine its nature as well. We see then that the 22.5 percent of those who voted for PASOK in the parliamentary elections of 1981 went over to the ND now. This crossover cannot in any way be attributed to the personal attraction of Mr. Zafeiropoulos; it is most probable, and in their overwhelming majority, that these voters would have voted for the ND candidate no matter who he was. As to how much the turnabout can be attributed to purely guild evaluations, or whether it can be attributed to more generalized disillusionment of these voters by PASOK's policy, is something that cannot be ascertained; the only thing that is certain is that it is a matter of a political act.

Only 3 percent went to EDIK [Democratic Center Union], KODISO and KKE (Interior). Finally, 24.5 percent voted against the psychology of the "lost vote" and contrary to party orders to vote for independent "progressive" candidates.

This vote of 24.5 percent of PASOK voters shows, at first glance, a total contrast from the 27 percent of voters who, in 1981, voted for the candidate of the KKE, Mr. Makhairas. However, this would happen if the 1981 vote for Mr. Makhairas were positive; if, that is, it meant that the PASOK voters, who voted for him, did it because either they desired Mr. Makhairas personally or the front with the KKE.

The 1984 vote demonstrated that the 1981 vote was negative. The voters did not vote for Mr. Makhairas because they wanted to elect him president; they voted for him because they did not want to elect the candidate of PASOK as president. Because the safest way to prevent his election was by electing Mr. Makhairas was precisely the reason so many (1,000) voted for him while so few protested (75) the party's preference by voting for Pondikopoulos.

As to how much this negative vote was against the party candidate, Mr. Giannopoulos, or against the method of imposing a candidate, or both, is impossible to determine. What is certain is that it was a negative vote. For this reason, now that the artificially-created front of 1981 became the official policy, they voted against it. What I want to say is that it was not Makhairas who got the PASOK in trouble, as an evening newspaper concluded, but, once more, the manner by which Mr. Makhairas was imposed from above, or, perhaps, by misinterpreting the meaning of the 1981 vote. However, if I thought that those who went over to the independents did it in order not to vote against the front, but against the dictates of their party, the fact remains that the Popular Front did not constitute for them an attraction as it does not appear to be the prospect of a "true change," as the KKE means it.

In the very limited way in which we can generalize the "trend" of the DSA elections, we can say that it gives us the following information:

The Popular Front, on whose prospects many PASOK technocrats, ministers and others relied to counteract the natural attrition of the first 4-year term, will not show itself to be the correct pre-electoral solution.



Dictating to the electorate, by eliminating the cross of preference and, therefore, the right to choose the deputies that the leadership of PASOK is attempting to impose, will cause a reaction.

If the parliamentary elections are held under the simple proportional system, we will have a blossoming of independents. If the elections are held under the reinforced proportional system, PASOK will be threatened by the ND (a fact that will depend, of course, on its own condition).

Neither KODISO nor EDIK nor the KKE (Interior) appear able to gain significantly from any disenchantment of the voters with PASOK.

Finally, it must be pointed out that the victory of the ND's candidate in the repeat election of 6 March 1984 cannot be explained, either by the more numerous voter-turnout of the voters of the Right or by the abstentions or null and void ballots of the far-leftists and others who in that manner rejected the KKE candidate. Mr. Zafeiropoulos could not have obtained as many as 5,140 ballots and Mr. Makhairas remain at 4,924, if approximately one-fourth of those who voted for Mourikis or Kalligas had not preferred the ND directly instead of the KKE by voting now for Zafeiropoulos.

However, we will have the opportunity to check the possibility of generalizing from the DSA elections in the Euroelections in June.

#### Results of the DSA Elections (1981 and 1984)

<u>Party-Candidate</u>	1981 (9,518 votes)		1984 (10,071 votes)	
	<u>1981 Votes</u>		<u>1984 Votes</u>	
Right-Mbrinias	2,700		ND-Zafeiropoulos	3,993
KODISO, Center			Ultra Right-Xydopoulos	302
Panagiotopoulos	353		Center-Vergados	173
PASOK-Giannopoulos	2,917		KODISO-Drosopoulos	222
Ind. PASOK-Pondikopoulos	73		PASOK/KKE-Makhairas	3,502
KKE/KKE(Int)-Makhairas	3,262		KKE(Int)-Korkovelos	713
Independents-Dernitsiotis	207		Far Left-Liotsos	188
			Independents-Mourikis	699
			Kalligas	279

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## ANALYSIS OF 1981 CENSUS SHOWS AGING POPULATION

Athens OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek No 1561, 5 Apr 84 pp 17-19

[Text] The human population, which constitutes the most significant element of every geographical area, is not evaluated by its numerical size alone, but by its qualitative composition, its occupational activity, etc. It is evident that a population with a high percentage of individuals of minor or productive ages has the advantage when compared to a population where the percentage of the aged appears to have increased.

In order to evaluate the population by ages, certain indicators must be established among which some have special significance: the demographic dependence indicator, which expresses the ratio (percentage) of the population of the non-productive ages (0-14 years and 65 and over) to the productive ages (14-64 years), and the aging indicator, which expresses the ratio (percentage) of the population of the aged (65 years and over) to the child and young adolescent population (0-14 years).

Despite the fact that during the century we live in, the population of our country has quadrupled, it has nevertheless developed in a counter-productive manner with regard to criteria of its composition according to age. Thus, while in 1907 there were 74 individuals of productive ages (15-64 years) per 100 individuals of dependent ages (children and the aged), in 1981 they were limited to 57. To this difference there contributed, on the one hand, the decrease of the quantitative contribution of the population between the ages of 0 to 14 years, while, on the other hand, there was a corresponding increase in the number of aged (65 years and over) from 4 percent to 13 percent. With these data, the aging indicator of the country's population during the period under review increase fivefold (from 11 in 1907 to 54 in 1981). This phenomenon leaves a relatively "bitter taste" with regard to the by age breakdown of the country's population (See Table 1).

Nevertheless, at least for the time being, the by age structure of the Greek population does not show significant differences as compared to the corresponding breakdown of developed countries in Europe and North America. However, even within the EEC countries there are no significant differences to be found, both in the specific quantitative contributions by the large age groups (Table 2 columns 3, 4 and 5) and in the calculated indicator of demographic dependence (column 6). On the other hand, with regard to aging, the Greek population with a corresponding indicator of 54 is classified more or less on the same level as the populations of Holland (52), Italy (56) and France (58). Of all the EEC countries, Ireland

holds the lowest aging indicator and West Germany the highest (91). From the data of other countries which are included in the same table, it appears that the Turkish population has a very low aging indicator (12 as compared to the average in the EEC countries, 63; Greece, 54; Bulgaria, 52; and Yugoslavia, 36).

#### Breakdown by Region and Geographic Departments

From a more detailed analysis of the 1981 population census by regions, it appears that the agricultural areas have a relatively large percentage of the aged population (17.2 percent) and the smallest percentage of the population of the productive ages (59.8 percent). The urban regions, which are significantly increased by the influx of immigrants from the other regions, show the largest proportion of the population of the productive ages (65.9 percent) and the smallest of the aged ones (10.4 percent). These data presage an adverse demographic development, both generally for the country as a whole, and with strong emphasis for the rural areas, in particular. (See Table 3).

Finally, from the population structure by age of the geographic department (Table 4), it appears that the Ionian Islands have the highest ratio of aged (18.6 percent). There follow the Aegean Islands with 17.4 percent, the Peloponnisos with 16.4 percent, Ipeiros with 13.4 percent and the remainder of continental Greece and Evvoia with 13.2 percent. The lowest ratios of aged population are observed in Crete (10.1 percent), in the area of the capital (10.7 percent), in Thraki (11.1 percent), in Makedonia (11.7 percent) and in Thessalia (12.7 percent).

In the category of the productive ages (15-64 years), the capital area has the largest ratio of all of the other departments (67.1 percent). This is due both to the influx of immigrants from the other regions and to the fact that the area of the capital appears by itself in Table 4, without being thus influenced by rural areas as is done with all the other data in the same table.

The statistical study of the geographic distribution of the population is completed with the distribution of every nome in the country according to large age groups as it appeared from the data of the 1981 population census. (See Table 5). Based on these data, the corresponding aging indicators were calculated (column 7). At the same time, from the comparison of the aging indicators, which are based on the data of the 1971 population census, a trustworthy picture can be had of the time difference of the structure by age of the country's population during the 1971-1981 decade.

Thus, the average indicator of aging on a nationwide level increased from 42.9 in 1971 to 53.6 in 1981. This means that, while in 1971 for every 100 individuals under age 15 there were some 43 aged (65 years and over), after only one decade had elapsed (in 1981), there were approximately 11 more (54) of the latter.

The unfavorable consequences of this phenomenon in the social and economic sectors as well as in the national defense sector are evident.

From the data in the same table, it appears that the Samos Nome has the most aged population of all the other nomes of the country.

The situation in that nome is discouraging if one considers that for every 100 individuals under age 15 there are more than 125 aged (65 years and over), that is to say, a more than double ratio on a national level (54). Together with the Samos Nome, the first ten nomes with the highest indicator of aging are: Lesvos (100.7), Khios (99.2), Kefallinia (99.0), Levkas (98.7), Lakonia (97.1), Arkadia (94.4), Fokis (93.5), Messinia (87.8) and Lasithiou with an aging indicator of 86.0.

On the other hand, the series of the ten nomes with the lowest aging indicators are: Xanthi (36.1), Imathia (37.2), the balance of Attiki (41.3), Pieria (41.8), Salonica (42.1), Rodopi (43.7), Larisa (43.8), Dodekanisos (44.6), Preveza (45.1) and Aitolokarnania with an aging indicator of 46.1. (See Table 5, columns 9 and 10 for the corresponding standing order based on the data of the 1971 population census).

### Conclusions

The geographical distribution of the population in the nation does not develop in a balanced way, with the result that there has already been, for the size of the country, an excessive concentration of human masses in certain urban areas. As a matter of fact, this phenomenon, in combination with the continuing low birthrate and the increase in the population of the aged, serves to create a significant problem of national importance for the long-range interests of the country.

One of the basic reasons for this problem, which must be considered, is the non-application of a unified, systematic, long-term planning for the development of the country in all areas of social and economic life to provide for a relatively balanced development throughout the country to prevent the formation of provocative social and economic inequalities among the various regions.

The broadest economic decentralization, the need for which we have repeatedly called, will contribute to the solution of this problem. Thus, independently from the creation of industrial zones in the urban areas, which do not provide an entirely correct solution to the problem, the broadest dispersion of isolated economic units must be sought in order that the excess and underemployed working potential of the countryside can be absorbed without workers having to leave their hometowns.

The creation of strong barriers on the one-way streets that lead the human masses to a very few urban centers--especially to the capital and Salonica--constitutes a national need that is connected even to the survival itself of our race. This, however, is not achieved either through prayer or by force, but by long-term planning aimed at the balanced social, economic and cultural development of all the regions of the country.

Table 1. Percentage of the Population Distribution of Greece by Large Age Groups for the Years 1907-1981.

Year	Population		Age Groups			Indicators	
	(1,000)	%	0-14	15-64	over 65	Demographic dependence	Aging
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
107	2,630.4	100	38	58	4	74	11
1920	5,014.1	100	34	60	6	66	16
1928	6,184.6	100	32	62	6	61	18
1951	7,632.8	100	29	64	7	54	23
1961	8,388.6	100	27	65	8	54	31
1971	8,768.4	100	25	64	11	57	43
1981	9,740.4	100	24	63	13	57	54

Source: ESYE. a) Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1982, p.28. b) 1981 Population Census.

Table 2. Percentage of the Population Distribution of Selected Countries by Large Age Groups.

Areas-Countries	Year	Age Groups			Indicators	
		0-14	15-64	Over 65	Demographic dependence	Aging
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1. EEC Countries						
EEC 9 Countries (*)	1980	22	64	14	56	63
Greece	1981	24	63	13	57	54
U.K.	1980	22	64	15	57	68
Belgium	1980	20	66	12	51	69
France	1980	24	62	14	60	58
W.Germany	1980	18	66	16	52	91
Denmark	1980	22	64	14	56	65
Ireland	1980	31	58	11	71	35
Italy	1980	22	63	13	58	56
Luxembourg	1980	18	69	13	46	73
Netherlands	1980	22	66	11	51	52
2. Other Countries						
Bulgaria	1978	22	66	12	51	52
Yugoslavia	1977	25	66	9	52	36
Spain	1978	26	63	11	59	40
Portugal	1977	28	62	10	61	35
Romania	1978	26	64	10	57	39
Turkey	1975	40	55	5	81	12

(\*) Data for Greece are not included

Source: a. 1981 Population Census. 2. UN Demographic Yearbook 1979, pp. 226-235.  
c. Eurostat, Social Indicators for the European Community, 1960-1975, Luxembourg, 1977, p 76



Table 3. Structure of the Population by Large Age Groups (percentage). Entire Country and Urban, Semi-Urban and Rural Areas. 1981 Population Census.

Areas	Age Groups			Indicators	
	0-14	15-64	over 65	Demographic dependence	Aging
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Entirety of Greece					
Both sexes	23.7	63.6	12.7	57	54
Males	24.8	63.9	11.3	56	46
Females	22.6	63.5	13.9	57	61
Of both sexes					
Urban	23.7	65.9	10.4	52	44
Capital area	22.2	67.1	10.7	49	48
Salonica region	23.3	67.4	9.3	48	40
Rest of urban regions	26.2	63.5	10.3	57	39
Semi-urban	25.6	61.9	12.5	61	49
Rural	23.0	59.8	17.2	67	75

Source: ESYE, 1981 Population Census.

Table 4. Structure of the Population of the Geographical Departments of the Country by Large Age Groups. 1981 Census.

Geographical departments	Age Groups			Indicators	
	0-14	15-64	over 65	Demographic dependence	Aging
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Entirety of Greece	32.7	63.6	12.7	57	54
Capital region	22.2	67.1	10.7	49	48
Rest Contl. Greece	25.2	66.6	13.2	63	52
Peloponnisos	23.7	59.9	16.4	67	69
Ionian Islands	22.2	59.2	18.6	69	83
Ipeiros	24.6	62.0	13.4	61	55
Thessalia	24.8	62.5	12.7	60	51
Makedonia	24.2	64.1	11.7	56	48
Thraki	24.7	64.2	11.1	56	45
Aegean Islands	23.1	59.5	17.4	68	75
Crete	25.5	64.4	10.1	55	40

Source: ESYE, 1981 Population Census.

Table 5. Percentage of the Population's Distribution by Large Age Groups on a Nome Level. Aging Indicator.

Geographical departments and nomes	Total population		Percentage of distribution			1981 Population Census Aging Indicator Standing (*)			
	(1,000)	(%)	0-14	15-64	65 +	1981	1971	1981	1971
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Entirety of Greece	9,739.6	100.0	23.7	63.6	12.7	53.6	42.9		
Capital region	3,027.6	100.0	22.2	67.1	10.7	48.4	43.8		
Rest Contl. Greece and									
Evvoia	1,100.0	100.0	25.2	61.6	13.2	52.4	41.8		
Aitolia -Akarnania	220.0	100.0	28.3	58.6	13.1	46.1	31.3	40	40
Attiki (rest)	341.9	100.0	25.4	64.1	10.5	41.3	34.2	47	35
Voiotia	117.3	100.0	25.2	61.5	13.3	52.8	47.0	34	20
Evvoia	188.4	100.0	24.8	60.4	14.8	59.5	50.3	24	17
Evrytania	26.3	100.0	21.7	60.3	18.0	82.8	39.4	11	28
Fthiotis	161.8	100.0	23.0	62.1	14.9	64.6	45.3	17	21
Fokis	44.3	100.0	20.4	60.6	19.0	93.5	45.3	8	3
Peloponnisos	1,012.5	100.0	23.7	59.9	16.4	68.9	50.4		
Argolis	92.7	100.0	24.2	61.8	14.0	57.9	47.4	27	19
Arkadia	108.1	100.0	21.0	59.1	19.9	94.4	59.0	7	11
Akhaia	275.2	100.0	25.7	61.9	12.4	48.4	41.2	36	25
Ileia	160.3	100.0	24.1	58.7	17.2	71.2	42.5	15	24
Korinthia	123.1	100.0	23.9	61.5	14.6	61.0	52.2	22	14
Lakonia	93.2	100.0	21.5	57.6	20.9	97.1	64.6	6	7
Messinia	159.9	100.0	22.7	57.3	20.0	87.8	57.6	9	12
Ionian Islands	182.3	100.0	22.2	59.2	18.6	83.5	65.5		
Zakynthos	29.9	100.0	23.1	58.5	18.4	79.9	56.8	12	13
Kerkyra	99.6	100.0	22.0	61.1	16.9	74.4	62.0	13	9
Kefallinia	31.1	100.0	22.3	55.6	22.1	99.0	73.5	4	3
Levkas	21.7	100.0	21.8	56.7	21.5	98.7	69.4	5	5
Ipeiros	324.7	100.0	24.6	62.0	13.4	54.6	34.1		
Arta	80.1	100.0	24.8	61.7	13.5	54.6	33.4	31	37
Thesprotia	41.4	100.0	25.2	59.7	15.1	59.8	30.1	23	43
Ioannina	147.1	100.0	23.3	62.3	14.4	62.0	45.1	20	22
Preveza	56.1	100.0	27.5	60.1	12.4	45.1	28.9	41	44
Thessalia	695.3	100.0	24.8	62.5	12.7	51.2	37.6		
Karditsa	124.8	100.0	24.9	60.7	14.4	57.5	34.8	28	34
Larisa	254.1	100.0	25.5	63.4	11.1	43.8	33.8	43	36
Magnisia	182.1	100.0	23.3	63.4	13.3	57.1	50.3	29	15
Trikala	134.3	100.0	25.4	61.3	13.3	52.4	34.2	35	35
Makedonia	2,121.6	100.0	24.2	64.1	11.7	48.1	38.4		
Grevena	36.7	100.0	24.7	60.0	15.3	61.8	36.4	21	32
Drama	94.7	100.0	24.1	61.5	14.4	59.5	44.7	24	23
Imathia	133.8	100.0	26.8	63.2	10.0	37.2	31.0	48	41
Salonica	871.3	100.0	23.5	66.6	9.9	42.1	39.1	45	30
Kavala	135.0	100.0	23.7	62.2	14.1	59.4	49.5	25	17
Kastoria	53.3	100.0	24.4	61.8	13.8	56.6	70.2	30	4
Kilkis	81.7	100.0	22.2	63.9	13.9	62.7	39.2	19	29
Kozani	146.9	100.0	26.1	61.5	12.4	47.6	33.5	39	38
Pella	132.2	100.0	24.5	63.7	11.8	48.1	32.7	37	39

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Pieria		107.0	100.0	26.9	61.8	11.3	41.8	33.2	46	38
Serrai		196.2	100.0	24.0	63.0	13.0	54.2	35.2	32	33
Florina		52.3	100.0	23.6	61.6	14.8	62.7	39.1	19	30
Khalkidiki		79.0	100.0	24.0	62.0	14.0	58.4	40.3	26	26
Agion Oros		1.5	100.0	2.1	71.7	26.2				
Thraki		345.1	100.0	24.7	64.2	11.1	45.1	31.6		
Evros		148.4	100.0	22.3	65.8	11.9	53.3	35.2	33	33
Xanthi		88.8	100.0	29.2	60.3	10.5	36.1	28.1	49	45
Rodopi		107.9	100.0	24.4	64.9	10.7	43.7	30.7	44	42
Aegean Islands		428.3	100.0	23.1	59.5	17.4	75.4	61.4		
Dodekanisos		144.7	100.0	26.2	62.1	11.7	44.6	37.7	42	31
Kyklades		88.6	100.0	22.7	60.8	16.5	72.8	60.0	14	10
Lesvos		104.6	100.0	21.1	57.6	21.3	100.7	79.8	2	2
Samos		40.4	100.0	20.1	54.7	25.2	125.2	96.8	1	1
Khios		50.0	100.0	21.1	57.9	21.0	99.2	68.6	3	6
Crete		502.2	100.0	25.5	64.4	10.1	39.5	46.1		
Irakleion		243.8	100.0	27.2	59.7	13.1	47.8	40.1	38	27
Lasithion		69.9	100.0	21.8	59.5	18.7	86.0	62.8	10	8
Rethymni		62.6	100.0	26.0	56.5	17.5	67.5	49.6	16	16
Khania		125.9	100.0	23.9	61.1	15.0	62.9	47.9	18	18

(\*) Beginning with the nome with the highest rate of aging

Source: Results of the corresponding population census

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## LOW-LEVEL AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM COMPONENTS SURVEYED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Mar 84 pp 34-42

[Article by Rudolf Walter]

[Text] The weapon, that is, the antiaircraft gun or the guided missile system, is indisputably the bearer of the antiaircraft combat function. The combat value of the weapon depends, however, precisely upon the defense against low-level aircraft, helicopters, drones, and RPV's within the short time available to target them and with the coordinated methods of target reconnaissance and weapon control. Lt Col Rudolf Walter of the army staff deals in the following article with the technical aspects of ground-based defense against low-level aircraft and shows the various methods of detection and weapon control. He concludes that in the short combat distances of about 2,000 m, which are forced by the extremely low level, the light machine cannon, because of its short reaction time, is superior to the missile, which is better used at greater combat distances.

#### The Target Spectrum

In the altitude range to be considered between 0 and 100 m above ground, the defense system must reckon with the most varied of aircraft:

- jet aircraft
- cruise missiles
- propellor aircraft
- drones and RPV's
- tethered platforms
- helicopters.

Jet aircraft usually use this altitude to saturate the defense in low-level formations and in this way to break through to the target in the depth of the operational area. The same process applies to the return flight. At flight speeds of 250 m/s the altitude is dependent upon the terrain. At about 50 m in the target area, varying speeds and also greater altitudes will appear according to the type of bombs and onboard equipment. A capable air defense prohibits the "roaming about" of individual fighter bombers toward targets.

Cruise missiles appear as individual targets. They fly from 200 m/s up to mach 2 on preprogrammed paths at altitudes of 50 m. Short targeting times and small radar reflection cross sections (smaller than  $0.1 \text{ m}^2$ ) make combatting these targets very difficult.

Propeller aircraft with one or two effective, quiet propeller turbines have proven to be cost-effective weapons carriers in non-European conflicts because of their lower speed -- 80 to 130 m/s -- and with this the ability to use cover better than jet aircraft to approach the target and surprise the air defense.

Because of the extremely advanced miniaturization of avionics and of modern equipment, drones and RPV's have a wide range of uses -- battlefield supervision, reconnaissance of certain ground targets, target illumination for guided missiles, attack on ground targets (for example, tank defense drones), removal of antiaircraft, saturation of antiaircraft, and electronic combat control.

Besides their use for the saturation of radar and electrooptically supported antiaircraft defense, in which drones are sent in in great numbers at the head of penetrating formations, these aircraft are also used individually. Here they approach their target area at 35 to 70 m/s and at about 50 m altitude in order to operate later at 300 to 3,000 m above ground. Their effective cross section is usually smaller than  $0.1 \text{ m}^2$ .

Tethered platforms only go up for reconnaissance under very unusual circumstances within the range of forward antiaircraft weapons because the long time at the same place extremely reduces their survival potential.

Helicopters are used more and more world-wide, even for combat operations, because of their flexibility. While the other aircraft can only follow the terrain in "flattened" flight profiles, helicopters between 0 and 95 m/s can follow a contour flight at ground level with narrow horizontal and vertical curve radii (nap of the earth). The more they succeed in this, the shorter the time for detection and attack becomes.

Fire power, possible armament, and the possibility of adjusting their air speed in rapid reaction to the course of ground operations make helicopters into air attacking forces that, with the utilization of ground formation and ground cover -- and above all when friend and foe are tightly intermeshed -- can give more direct support to attacking spearheads than can jet aircraft.

With helicopters equipped with guided missiles, effective antitank concentrations can be formed or shifted. Here the antiaircraft defense must count on a targeting time of 10 to 35s, depending upon the effectiveness of the air/ground reconnaissance, the control procedure, and the combat distance. Sensors for target detection that are placed over the main rotor are to prevent the helicopter being detected before it begins its mission. Equipment mounted at the same place for target illumination increases the survival potential both of the "illuminator" and of the weapons carrier, which only has to appear briefly to start the guided missile. Similarly short appearance times can be attained by the use of missiles with passive homing (fire and forget).



with increasing effectiveness of the ground-based antiaircraft defense, the expected target density increases at the lowest flight levels, since this area, precisely because of the possibility of using ground formations and cover for approach and departure, offers the best conditions for added survival potential. In these flight profiles, however, the air enemy loses some of his air/ground observation.

As a rule, the extremely low-level flight (around 20 m above ground) requires visual sight -- therefore the reconnaissance and defense weapons (antenna height or firing height up to about 3 m) need a medium combat distance of 1,500 to 2,500 m. When there is no visual sight, high frequency altimeters become active on board the aircraft, and passively functioning obstacle-warning machines and terrain-following detectors are put into use.

Because of the low-level flight, the ground-based antiaircraft defense often has only very short periods of time to identify the target, aim the weapons, and fire.

Technical improvements have shortened the length of individual operations in defense and therefore the total reaction time, particularly in duel situations.


#### Target Identification

Rapid, far-reaching, and infallible and accurate target identification is the first prerequisite for early -- and therefore sufficiently long-duration -- defense. It takes place in four steps:

- Thorough search of the air space
- Taking a bearing on the direction/locations of aircraft
- identification friend/enemy
- Forming and transmitting of information


As the flight levels become lower and lower -- depending upon the terrain -- the detection area of these sensors becomes smaller, and shadow areas in which aircraft cannot be discovered shorten it even more. But in the visible areas as well, the task of the sensors that use electromagnetic radiation becomes more difficult: with decreasing flight altitudes, the contrast formation -- so necessary for the definite identification of the target -- that results from ground reflection, varying background, and weather factors, becomes more and more critical. One must also count on the enemy trying to completely distort the evaluation of useful signals by small reflection cross sections, camouflage, and absorption paint, as well as by electronic deception or adaptive disturbance (low-power static transmitters cause the target, which is operating in the ground reflections, to disappear in static without this countermeasure being immediately recognizable).

These target conditions determine the demands on the deployment of the technical sensors with regard to:



Key:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Time diagram for combatting a helicopter 2,500 m away that is seen for 15 sec. | 6. Tube Weapon, 35 mm, HEI Aligned according to |
| 2. Goal   | -- Azimuth angle                                |
| 3. Guided Missile Weapon  | -- Height angle (correction)                    |
| 4. Activation   | 7. Fire Burst                                   |
| 5. Tube Weapon, 35 mm, HEI Aligned according to                                   | 8. Height Correction                            |
| -- Azimuth Angle  | 9. Detection/Identification                     |
| -- Height Angle   | 10. Turret Rotation                             |
| -- Distance   | 11. Weapon Control Calculation                  |
|   | 12. Ammunition Flight Time                      |



Key:

1. Discrimination Space

- Detection range and volume
- Scanning and information renewal rate
- Detection ability against extremely low-flying aircraft
- Signal processing in a wide speed range
- Radar discriminatory ability at a distance and at angles of height and width
- Resistance to electronic countermeasures

Since most individual requirements stand in an opposite, changing relationship to one another, the technical solutions must always allow for point optimization or compromises.

#### Active Sensors

Active sensors, such as radar and laser devices, beam the necessary energy to identify the target themselves. However, sources of radiation that are usually strong can be detected by the enemy and be opposed by countermeasures.

- In the future radar equipment will play a decisive role in air control because of its advantages -- attainable high radiation density, comparatively little dependence upon optical sight conditions, and relatively high accuracy of location. For wide-range reconnaissance of very low-level targets, detection ranges of between 10 and 30 km slant range are sufficient, since on the basis of the earth's curvature and calculation, a target must fly at least 50 m high in order to be detected at the maximum distance (30 km). The altitude coverage reaches about 3,000 m, the operating frequency bands lie between some 100 MHz and 10 GHz.

The form of the main lobe of the antenna diagram authoritatively determines the detection volume. Radar equipment used for target detection have in the main  $\text{cosec}^2$  -- or similar rotational symmetrical main lobes (pencil beams).

The threat basically requires that the detection volume be scanned as fast as possible in the azimuth from 0 to 360 degrees. By means of the high information renewal rates here, the probability that the air defense will be surprised is reduced.

With  $\text{cosec}^2$  main lobes, this requirement can easily be fulfilled by mechanical hand turning of the antenna. This advantage must be attained at the cost of the following disadvantages caused by large impulse volumes:

- The radiation density that determines the formation of the target echo signal is low.
- The great discrimination space detects at the same time a multiplicity of unwanted echo signals (clutter) that come from the ground as well as from terrain characteristics and can cover up target echoes.
- The determination of altitude and with this of the verticle formation discrimination is not possible.

These disadvantages do not apply to rotation symmetrical main lobes. However, their small impulse volumes require laborious, usually combined scanning processes (mechanical turning of the phased-array-antennas) that can also reduce the scanning rate.

Above all, the pulse-Doppler-radar equipment is best suited for the detection of low-level aircraft. It separates the usable echo signal of the transmitter frequency from that of the "clutter" surrounding the target after evaluation of the Doppler effect caused by the radial speed of the aircraft. The "sub clutter visibility" reached in this way is about -50 to -60 dB.

Hovering helicopters, targets of highest priority because of their dangerousness, lack the radial speed vector of the airframe. The Doppler evaluation must therefore be based on the considerably weaker echo signals that get their Doppler effect from the movements of the linkage of the main rotor and the rear rotor. In this case, the solution of the problem of assured signal recognition is made difficult by the contrary demand for higher information renewal rate.

At the same time, both demands can only be fulfilled by a complicated digitalized signal processing. The essential prerequisite for this is that the most exact data possible on the Doppler spectra of the awaited helicopter are available for all aspect angles as specified values for the signal processing, which, after comparison with the Doppler spectrum of the received echo value (reading) permit the recognition of the hovering helicopter.

If the automatic signal evaluation cannot be done, the operator must be brought into the automatic control system. If he suspects a hovering helicopter because of changes in the ground clutter picture of the sighting apparatus, he can, by stopping the antenna in the angular bearing in question or by a close sector search, increase the number of target echo signals until the radar evaluation delivers the target video or the operator clearly identifies the helicopter on the basis of the audio signal (Doppler tones). During this time, however, the remaining, far greater part of the detection volume is not checked.

In these radar machines, the automatic identification is based on a question-answer process (IFF) that only delivers a clear friend recognition. The identification "enemy" necessary for attack, can be derived from additional space-time criteria. These operations, however, limit operational freedom both of one's own aircraft and also of the defense.

#### Millimeter Wave Radar

Millimeter wave radar equipment uses the minimums ("windows") of atmospheric attenuation, that lie in the areas around 35 and 90 GHz. The conditions of propagation of the very short waves specialize the use of millimeter wave radar equipment to close area observation at distances up to 3,000 m. Because of its better penetrating ability through smoke and very thick, often artificial fog, and also because of its small mechanical size, it becomes an alternative to optronic (IR/laser) as well as electro-optical (TV) and optical

sensors. Developmental efforts aim at showing the target by the quite narrow line scans of the area made possible by the millimeter wave band in connection with an efficient, highly integrated, digitalized signal evaluation. This process enables a very detailed target reconnaissance simultaneously with the identification. Because of the relatively great expenditure of time for the assured picture formation, it can only be used in sector observation.

### Laser

Laser sensors are used exclusively for supporting distance measurement with passively working reconnaissance means. They are not suited for observational tasks because their extremely narrow radiation clustering (1 to 0.5 mrad) takes too much time for space scanning and in the process requires too high a medium performance of the laser.

### Passive Sensors

Passively operating sensors are not detectable by the enemy electronic reconnaissance. For the detection of aircraft they use the electromagnetic radiation -- above all heat or visible radiation, but also sound energy -- coming from the target. However, since the signals received lack a time element, the sensors can only give the direction of the target, take bearings, that is, but they can do this with great accuracy of 1 to 2 mrad. The lateral direction toward the target is above all in a duel situation the most important short distance information for the introduction of the defense process. The missing distance information is delivered by the attached laser or radar apparatus.

The following sensors operating in the infra-red area are suitable for target detection:

- IR detection instruments use temperature distribution to separate the target from its surroundings. During scanning at small angles of elevation, about 10 to 15 degrees, high horizontal scanning rates can be obtained. This process makes possible the limitation of the threatened sector by the detection of rising exhaust gas heat from helicopters hovering behind cover or flying very slowly, and by the rough reporting of this information to intelligence and weapons units.

- Thermal imagers scan the scene within their view by lines. The picture obtained from the temperature differences is of high quality and is presented on display units. Its discrimination permits a friend/enemy identification within the accepted detection or attack distance of 2,500 m even in haze so thick it blocks optical sight. Thermal imagers are only suited for sector observation because of their narrow field of view.

- Peak frequency sensors use the electromagnetic energy that is emitted above all by the obstruction, warning, terrain-following, mapping, and weapons radar equipment of the aircraft. The evaluation of these clear signals, which are certain to be picked up because of one-way propagation -- in spite of spreading and curving -- makes possible the early detection of the enemy and



with this the advance warning in the threatened sector. In addition, these signals can also be used for ground based electronic disturbance or deception of the avionic. The goal is to force the enemy to greater altitudes and thus into the effective area of a larger number of antiaircraft weapons.

- Eye Observation. The human being is dependent upon optical sight and therefore has quite a limited detection area. Optical and electrooptical aids (binoculars, TV cameras), whose night vision capability can be improved by image intensifiers, do, to be sure, increase the detection range of the observer, but also limit his field of vision considerably. The range is greatly reduced by fog, snow, rain, and smoke.

Dependent upon the threat, the depth of our own defense, and the degree of mobility of ground operations, reconnaissance resources of the antiaircraft can

- be integrated in the weapons systems (internal reconnaissance),
- be placed near the firing units to be supported in positions favorable to reconnaissance (external reconnaissance),
- be combined for the intensification of air space observation over a larger area into a unit (reconnaissance system).

The information gained from reconnaissance about the air situation is connected to a polar (azimuth and distance) or Cartesian (east and north value) coordinate system and then transmitted as a spoken report or data telegram over the means of communication at hand to the weapons systems. Digitalized data telegrams can be given directly to the aiming equipment.


External target reconnaissance shortens the time for weapons direction, since on the basis of the advance warning weapons control sensors and defense weapons can be brought into the target azimuth angle even before the onboard sensors of the weapons system is able to fix the target.

The amount of time gained is, dependent upon the azimuth angle difference to the target, up to four seconds. In this way, the defense weapons can also combat such targets for which there would not have been enough time in the "autonomous" operation supported by internal orientation.

#### Weapons Control


In external weapons control, the appropriate weapons systems are selected by a command post on the basis of external sensors that report targets from the current air situation. Threat estimation and optimal time distribution are done with the support of calculators.

This form of direction of the firefight is necessary when in saturation formations it is important to combat the most possible targets with the available ammunition and to avoid overkills. It also allows for the combined firing of antiaircraft.



Key:

1. 35 mm (subcaliber)
2. Tube Weapon
3. Time Gain
4. Guided Missile Weapon
5. Limit of the Internal Dead Zone
6. Internal Dead Zone of Guided Missiles



Suggestion for a missile weapons carrier with raisable platform

Internal weapons control includes the continuous, weapon-specific, derivation of the azimuth and altitude angle and distance information as well as their transfer to the aiming of the weapon.

The technical principle of the weapon control sensors according to angle and distance measurement corresponds generally to that of the reconnaissance equipment. For exact bearings according to azimuth and altitude, pencil beam antenna diagrams with narrow beam angles of the main lobes are used exclusively.

The locking-on of weapon control sensors to targets flying at ground level or before screens is made difficult and delayed by the contrast problems that arise. At the same time, the main lobes of target tracing equipment, because of the narrow elevation angle, touch the earth according to their frequency-determined beaming.

The result is that in addition to the hindrance from clutter, the multiple spread causes the mirror image effect, which leads to various mistakes in angle and distance measurement. This also makes target tracing difficult and can even interrupt it. In such cases, the weapon control must be immediately transferrable to higher frequency sensors (millimeter-wave radar, IR, TV, and optical equipment with laser for distance measurement) with even narrower main lobes.

The locking-in process of aircraft with infrared target seeking direction (fire and forget) can be hindered by a multiplicity of radiation sources, particularly by

- enemy infrared countermeasures,
- fires on the battlefield,
- heated ground positions and ground cover,
- cloud edges radiated by the sun.

In these surroundings, separation of the useful signals from the false targets is possible by training the operator in the evaluation of the pre-start signals from the search head and by technical precautions, for example, "two-colored search heads" with selective signal evaluation for start and flight phase.

The time lags possible in automatic target detection can be reduced under proper sight conditions by the use of optical aiming devices that provide a rapid servotracking of one or more weapon positions in azimuth and altitude angles on the observer's line of sight. Helmet sights with highly integrated, rapid signal processing and wireless data transmission are particularly suited for this purpose as signal sources.

The accelerated turning and exact alignment of the weapon to the azimuth angle, particularly with heavy gun mounts, require drive motors with a steep rise in

power output, accelerated braking, and less vibration. Smooth azimuth speeds lie between 80 and 120 degrees per second.

Because of favorable performance/mass ratios, the highest angle speeds can be reached manually with portable guided missile shoulder weapons.

While with tubed artillery and unguided missiles, particularly at short distance, fire can be opened immediately upon aiming, a runout time must be calculated with guided missile weapons for the activation and operation of the guidance.

The reaction speed and effectiveness of tube and guided missile systems by remote control also depends upon the performance of the weapon control calculation. Digital calculators and processors are proving to be best here because of their great flexibility, rising processing speed, and continual miniaturization. By changing the user programs (software changes), fire control can be adjusted to rapidly changing conditions.

In weapon control, reaction time can be won by high azimuth aiming speed, sure and undelayed locking-on to the target, and rapid stabilization of the fire control calculation.

#### Antiaircraft Weapons

Machine cannon and guided and unguided missiles are suitable as weapons against low-level aircraft.

#### Machine Cannon

Antiaircraft weapons of 20 to 40 mm caliber, usually with several barrels, with rates of fire between 200 and 9,000 rounds/min, achieve firing densities with high probability of hitting and destroying targets with greatly differing speeds. Also, the hit probability, particularly against accelerating aircraft, can be improved by limited weapons spread. Another improvement factor is the shortened flying time of low caliber rounds.

In a duel situation with helicopters appearing by surprise, the fragmentation effect of 35 to 40 mm rounds that detonate in the screen surrounding the target can force the aircraft to give up its mission. Proximity fuzes can be used cost effectively from one caliber of 40 mm. They increase the hit probability of rapid reaction fire that is only roughly aimed at the azimuth.

For combatting helicopters at distances up to 6,000 m, there are concepts for automatic 76 mm weapons. However, their heavy turrets are not suited to the high azimuth speeds necessary in close combat.

#### Unguided Missiles

Unguided missiles of small caliber and high speed in multiple starting complexes are also suitable as self-protection weapons against helicopters popping up at the shortest distance.

## Guided Missiles

Guided missiles with remote (for example, command or light beam) or self guidance (infrared-target seeking guidance) are suitable for combatting targets at hit distances from about 1,000 m. They therefore have a "dead zone." The realizable high cross acceleration also enables highly maneuverable targets to be intercepted.

For maximum effectiveness, two paths are basically taken:

- either high guidance accuracy with smaller mass of the warhead. Here a direct hit is sought after in which the target is destabilized by the kinetic energy of the striking missile and the blast effect -- if possible, within the air frame,
- or great mass of warheads, which, detonated near the target by a proximity fuze, compensate for the lesser guidance accuracy.

The use of guided missiles at very small angles of elevation, as in defense against aircraft flying close to the ground, is problematical from the start. In order to keep the missile from stalling after leaving the starter and then hitting the ground, it must either be more strongly accelerated and/or started with greater launching arm height. Both lead to the extension of the inner "dead zone." In this situation, the light missile with the extended starting flight path is preferred. Proximity fuzes must be disconnectable and connectable during the flight to prevent their unwanted activation while passing ground cover.

These problems can be solved if the missiles are started, for example, from an elevated platform. With the weapons carrier concept, far more suitable firing positions with greater effective areas can be obtained than with traditional weapons carriers.

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CSO: 3620/253



## LIMASSOL CHAMBER ON CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 12 Apr 84 p 5

/Interview with Limassol Chamber of Commerce and Industry President Kyriakos Khamboullas with Tasoula Mikhailidou, date and place not specified/

/Text/ "The business community views with concern and disappointment the economic developments in our country. The economic situation, which to a large extent depends on the actions of the businessmen themselves, is unhappily worsening at a very disturbing pace.

"In view of this serious threat to our economy, it is imperative that government, employees and employers, work together sincerely to save our country's economy which is the foundation of our political and national survival."

This was stated to us by the chairman of the Limassol Commerce and Industry Chamber Kyriakos Khamboullas during a recent discussion on our island's economic situation.

Khamboullas, to explain matters more fully, added: "Very few investments are made for new plants or for the expansion of the existing ones. Our exports are declining while imports increase at a disturbing rate.

"Unemployment is rising at a rapid pace and the deficit in the balance of trade is constantly growing. This deficit, which in 1982 amounted to 317.7 million pounds, went up to 381.4 million pounds in 1983, an increase of 21.6 percent.

"A major part of this deficit is covered by invisible revenues such as tourism, services to foreign countries, the British bases and the UN troops which are stationed on our island, foreign companies, aid we receive from abroad, from small investments of Cypriots and foreigners especially in housing, and from the temporary inflow of foreign exchange because of the uncertain situation that prevails in our neighboring countries.

"These invisible resources," Khamboullas went on, "are not constant and therefore we must create the conditions necessary to maintain and improve a stable and viable economy to the benefit of all our people.

"The business community views with concern the fact that in spite of the tremendous deficit in the balance of trade and in the state budget, state, semi-state and other organizations continue to submit requests for wage increases and other benefits which the Cypriot economy cannot sustain. One is entitled to ask where the money will come from to satisfy these demands. This is the 'big knot.' Should the government resort to new direct and indirect taxes or to a new special external loan for non-productive projects, which will lead to even greater obligations for the payment of interest and principal?

#### For the Farmers

"We are convinced," Khamboullas said, "that our farmers, who perform such a difficult and serious task for the country and who have the lowest per capita income, cannot take more taxes. The businessmen and the self employed who constitute a dynamic and productive section of the Cypriot people cannot possibly satisfy under present conditions the constantly increasing state expenditures and the continuing demands of the employees, without a quantitative increase of productivity.

"In the face of this great threat to our economy, it is necessary to have the sincere cooperation of government--employees--and employers to save the island's economy.

"I believe," Khamboullas went on, "that the government must face up to this serious situation with dynamic increases and to move forward with boldness, courage, and determination and take all appropriate measures, setting aside any temporary objections, because only in this way is it possible to protect the economy and the people's standard of living.

"Without delay, the government must assign to special committees composed of experts, both Cypriot and foreign, to find ways to control the rise of wages, salaries, and prices, and to place our economy on a stable and sound basis for the benefit of all the Cypriot people.

#### The Incentives

"The government, to help and contribute to the increase of exports, tourism, and the decrease of imports must give, correctly, several incentives--tax, customs, loan guarantees--for creating new viable industries.

"But to benefit from these incentives one must be able to make a profit and unfortunately, under current conditions very few enterprises show profit. Government guarantees for loans as well as customs deductions cannot be fully utilized and truly helpful for the industries without closer cooperation and coordination among the appropriate ministries to simplify and speed up the implementation of procedures required for granting these incentives.

"As things stand now we have many instances where the customs deductions, guarantees and lending is delayed without excuse with adverse effects on the affected industries."

Kyriakos Khamboullas said that on the one side the government correctly grants incentives to encourage exports and on the other it nullifies them with counter-incentives such as the continuing, unjust, and one-sided payment of the extraordinary contribution only by the businessmen and the self employed, the increase and imposition of new taxes on the telecommunication rates, on electricity, on the real estate taxes, on the rentals of land in industrial areas, etc.

"If we really want to increase our exports and to reduce our imports," Khamboullas said, "we must:

"1. Find ways to reduce the cost of production to make our products competitive in the countries of consumption. This can be achieved in part

a. with increased productivity;

b. with the modernization and automation of the production equipment;

c. with the merger of small similar industrial enterprises to make larger, viable units;

d. with production of better-quality products and the continuing improvement of products in demand in the countries of consumption;

e. with the timely and faithful fulfillment of orders according to specifications;

f. with careful, on-the-spot studies of existing and new markets abroad to ascertain kind, type, and quality of products wanted in each market; and

g. with the regular scheduling on set dates of ships, planes, and other transportation means for the shipping of our products to the countries of consumption.

"2. To speed up the customs union of Cyprus with the countries of the Common Market to help the export of certain industrial but mainly farm products to these countries which absorb more than 80 percent of our farm products, which today are subject to tariffs and quotas.

"The production and marketing of our products in our country and abroad is an extremely serious matter which must be taken up by the appropriate ministries as soon as possible.

#### Appropriate Farm Products

"It is necessary to have the appropriate planning and coordination among the ministries to make sure that we grow the types and qualities of fruits and

vegetables which can be sold in our country and abroad and which can be canned. We must pay much attention to the production of appropriate varieties of early and late fruits and vegetables for the markets abroad. Together with the increase in production it is necessary to take in time and simultaneously the necessary and effective measures for the marketing, especially of the products of the small farmers. It is a waste of money and hard work to spend millions of pounds for irrigation projects, to grant incentives, subsidies, and other steps to increase production when the products cannot be sold."

With regard to the imports, Khamboullas said we can reduce them or limit them with the proper information for the increased consumption of Cypriot products and with the further improvement of their quality, with a campaign to discourage overconsumption and with some tariff protection when the island's overall interests demand it, such as the saving of foreign exchange and the employment of a large number of Cypriot workers.

(The same views were presented in detail by Khamboullas in his address to the recent general assembly of the Limassol Commerce and Industry Chamber.)

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CSO: 3521/242

## ADVISORY COMMITTEE CALLS FOR DEFICIT REDUCTION

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 11 Apr 84 pp 1, 9

/Text/ The Advisory Finance Committee met yesterday under the chairmanship of Finance Minister S. Vasileiou. Present at the meeting were Minister of Labor and Social Insurances P. Papageorgiou, representatives of the Pan-Cyprian Labor Federation, the Pan-Cyprian Union of Civil Servants, the Confederation of Cypriot Workers, the Federation of Employers and Industrialists, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the director general of the Planning Office I. Aristeidou, and other appropriate government officials.

The focus of their discussion was the fiscal situation. The committee unanimously agreed that necessary measures must be taken soon for halting the present trends and for gradually decreasing the fiscal deficit in order to avoid possible future adverse consequences to the economy.

The next meeting of the committee was scheduled for April 27 and will discuss the report of the Technical Committee the finance minister appointed. The report includes recommendations for the adoption of measures which will help fight tax evasion and unnecessary tax deductions.

## The Government Spokesman

Commenting on the published reports on the status of the economy, the government spokesman stated that basically the country's economy is sound. He added that it is natural for the government to watch the economy's development and to forestall adverse developments, as it is also natural to discuss with all appropriate authorities and all classes, ways and measures which will help the economy to continue being sound to remain continually strong. Meetings, conferences and discussions on the economy take place continually and at all levels.

## Planning Committee Meeting

On the other hand, the Central Planning Committee met under the chairmanship of President Kyprianou and reviewed the results up until now of the Fourth Special 1982-86 Economic Action Plan and the policy concerning foreign companies in Cyprus. Following the report on the Special Plan, the committee discussed various aspects of the economy in conjunction with the Plan's goals



for the purpose of finding ways to advance its normal implementation. The discussion will continue at the next meeting of the committee, which is scheduled for Thursday, 26 April 1984. An official announcement states, in part:

"During the discussion on foreign companies, their problems and the policy needed, it was ascertained that these companies contributed considerably to the opportunities for employment, to the inflow of foreign exchange and to the import of new experiences and knowledge. It was also ascertained that the possible negative impact is limited and cannot diminish the multi-sided contributions of these companies. In this context the standard policy is to attract the greatest possible number of such companies. Toward this end the committee adopted the following measures:

"1. Establishment of a permanent committee whose members will be drawn from services related to the foreign companies and whose objective will be to give advice on policy issues for further developing Cyprus as a center in this sector. Among the subjects this advisory committee will study are the professional tax imposed on foreign companies by the municipalities, the granting of residence permits to foreign workers in such companies, and the recall of an expert for the purpose of specifying the legal framework concerning the foreign investments.

"2. Establishment of a unified central service in the Central Bank of Cyprus for the purpose of coordinating the procedures for approving and registering foreign companies, for granting residence and work permits to their personnel, etc.

"3. Organization of seminars for the purpose of updating the appropriate services on the government policy and on its more effective implementation.

"4. Preparation of a brochure by the advisory committee which will contain all relevant laws and regulations applying to the establishment and operation of foreign companies, thus facilitating those interested.

"5. Installation of an electronic computer in the Department of Company Inspection for the purpose of doing its work faster in general and for registering the foreign companies in particular.

"6. Informing and enlightening the foreigners who are interested in establishing a company in Cyprus on the basis of the established policy through their respective embassies or consulates and our commercial centers abroad."

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CSO: 3521/242

## SURVEY OF RISING PUBLIC DEBT

Nicosia 0 AGON in Greek 15 Apr 84 p 1

/Text/ The Bank of Cyprus warns that external borrowing, instead of contributing to economic development, will eventually lead to the depletion of domestic resources because the yield of investments paid with foreign debts is lower than the cost of the loans because of the high interest rates.

In a detailed study on external borrowing, the consequences and the possibility of repaying the loans, the bank also states that there is no immediate liquidity problem or servicing the external debt. But it emphasizes that it is necessary to try to change the recent trends in consumption and at the same time have greater autonomy of the public sector in the realization of its development plans with an increase of its revenue.

According to data mentioned in the study, the external debt of Cyprus reached 395.6 million pounds, compared to 24.3 million in 1973.

This increase represents an average annual increase of 32.2 percent which is one of the highest in the world considering that the average increase in the developing countries is only 20 percent.

The study states that at the beginning of the 1980s the conditions ripened, which allowed the Cypriot economy to return to normalcy, relying increasingly on its own forces. Yet this does not seem to be happening because of the great increase in consumption. According to the study it appears that the great masses of Cypriots want to satisfy as many needs today, not taking into account that a great percentage of the resources is borrowed and must be repaid.

With regard to the burden posed on the economy by the foreign debt, the study states that the percentage devoted to the servicing of the debt in 1983 reached the level of 12 percent. This percentage compares favorably with that of the developing countries.

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CSO: 3521/242

## NON-TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS SAID TO CONSTRAIN INNOVATION

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 22/23 Mar 84 p 19

[Article by Prof G. W. Wittkaemper, University of Muenster: "Obstacles Exist in the Area Outside Technology, but They Can Be Overcome with Imagination"]

[Text] The avowal of innovation is now mandatory in every after-dinner speech on the subject of the state and the economy. Since the so-called turnaround in Bonn, but also under the impression of urgent labor market problems, politicians and well-known personalities in the economy declare themselves openly for innovation, which is depicted as the great hieroglyph of hope on the horizon, and promises to be the solution both to growth problems and to problems of employment. Only rarely is it said what is actually understood by innovation, for example, innovation in products and processes, and even more rarely is it determined more precisely which innovations in products and processes are to bring the solution to all our problems.

In general there appears to be agreement that technological innovation is meant by innovation,, mostly applied to so-called key technologies, such as microelectronics or biotechnology, new materials technology or new energy technologies. In summary, it means that the predominant opinion in politics and the economy is tending to say that the German economy is being pinched by the shoe of technology in a spot that can be closely defined as a "technology gap in the area of key technologies."

This thesis does not stand up in the face of the results of present-day research in innovation and the bureaucracy. It must even be described as dangerous. It is my view that the state of research in the various sciences working in this area can presently be defined in the following three points, which supplement and change the above thesis:

Thesis 1: Crucial impediments to innovation exist in the relationship between the state and the economy in the FRG

In its development, the so-called social market economy of the FRG has increasingly become an interlocking system of market economics and nonmarket

economics. If it is correct that the economy, science, research and education in the FRG are faced with a great need to innovate, it can only be done if there is a corresponding, reliable prospect for innovation on the part of the state. Put another way: the success of every innovation in the area of the economy is materially influenced by whether there is a reliable prospect for innovation on the part of the state and the administration. I will give three examples:

In a research project which, on the basis of representative investigation, studied bureaucratic obstacles in the coexistence of industrial and residential built up areas, which is widespread in the FRG (the so-called conglomerate zoning ordinances), we came to this conclusion at the end of 1983: Employees in public administration, whose job is to solve the problem of the juxtaposition of industrial and residential areas, are, even in the opinion of the representatives of industry we questioned, confronting the problems of the economy with an open mind.

Existing legal standards in some minor areas stand in the way of a speedy solution to the problems, but otherwise do not in themselves prevent a solution. Both employees in public administration and those representatives of the economy we questioned identified a crucial obstacle as the inadequate training and continuing education of employees in public administration in science-related and methods-related knowledge and skills required to understand and treat the problems of the economy. Put another way: The lack of human investment in training and continuing education on the part of public administration was felt to be a crucial factor hampering innovation.

A second example: It is a platitude that information and access to information systems and specialized documentation systems are part of innovation. The design of specialized information systems for the state and the economy is moving ahead with difficulty rather than with expedition, not least because of numerous bureaucratic obstacles that have long been recognized. On the other hand, a long overdue German research network to link the universities of the FRG with each other and with specialized informations systems and centers in Europe and the rest of the world in the area of the most important sciences is out of the question.

One simple consequence of the lack of a German research network: In many institutes and seminars in the FRG, the student first has to spend 6 weeks in bibliographic research on the literature for a demanding seminar paper before he begins with the real analytical work. In Japan and the United States, networks are available at comparable institutions which allow the student access to data banks, with the help of which he can complete his bibliographic work in 1 day, perhaps even 1 and 1/2 hours, so that he gains more time for the analytical work or can solve more analytical problems in the same time. This has consequences for the new generation of scientists that the universities are providing to the economy.

Faced with this state of development in the German research network, it can come as no surprise that the idea for a so-called German educational network, such as I have long been advocating, has not even been clarified in a prelim-

inary study. An innovative industrial nation must equip its schools and the area of vocational education with forms of telecommunication and the possibilities for working in telecommunications which, for example, also make it possible to utilize parts of the specialized information systems for the area of school education. But we are far removed from that. As of this date, I have not received a confirmation of receipt for a proposal for a preliminary study which I submitted on 23 November 1983 at the Ministry for Education and Science, following discussion there.

A further example: The structure reports for 1980 and 1983/1984 showed everyone who still did not know that decisive innovations in the German economy will only be carried out when the middle-level economy is successfully brought into the process of supporting innovation.

In spite of numerous research papers relating to this question and political awareness, there is no practically usable supraregional model for technology support and technology counselling for the middle-level economy, such as a series of technology centers covering each area, which, in accordance with the requirements of the middle-level economy, maintain information, advice and opportunities for training and continuing education.

Instead of drawing up compromise formulations for our economic organization on the high plane of abstraction, the parties and the governments they form should see themselves in the position, on a supraregional basis, to set up a network of technology centers covering each area, with the middle-level economy as the target group, in an unbureaucratic form, as an aid to self-help, without opening up a new channel of subsidies.

Thesis 2: The rigidity of organizational structures in the companies themselves, both in vertical structure and work flow, and the rigidity of assumptions frequently hinder innovation.

I would like to clarify what is meant with a series of examples: Some American and German colleagues recently published leadership profiles of American, German and Japanese companies. A consistent component of the leadership profiles for American and Japanese companies was the task required of the board, for 1 day once a month, at the very latest for an entire day each quarter, with participation compulsory for all board members, to discuss questions of innovation, questions of product innovation, innovation in procedures and marketing.

One looks in vain in the leadership profiles of German companies for a required task of comparable breadth. I myself have participated in five board sessions of differently structured companies, which had been called specifically for the purpose to listen to experts from the technical universities and the area of technology policy and technology assistance on the subject of problems in innovation.

It was possible in only two of these sessions for the entire board to participate in the full day's activity. Even in these two cases it was impossible to prevent individual board members from being called out to take telephone calls during the short lectures and the subsequent discussion.



In the case of the three other board sessions, not all the board members participated in the discussions from the very start. In addition, about half of the participating board members were present only part of the time at the discussions. This points to an assumption which must be eliminated.

Not only rigid assumptions, rigid forms of organization in the vertical structure and work flow hinder innovation: here are two examples of this. A German company in the field of equipment and plant construction has an urgent development need in the area of biotechnology.

Two young scientists, with outstanding credentials in biotechnology, a biologist and a chemist, announce their willingness, under a freelance contract, to take on the development work which, even in this organizational form, can be supported by state assistance for innovation. As a consequence of the massive resistance of the "responsible" staff and development sections, the project had to be abandoned, mainly because of the lack of understanding for the young scientists' interest in completing their doctoral dissertations.

Or: One of the larger middle-level companies identifies gaps in tapping state assistance for technology. Finally a decision is made in favor of a specific program, which is supported by state aid. The company does not have a head of development. A highly qualified scientist, who had proved his capabilities in several comparable assignments, who has a part-time employment relationship with the company but who otherwise works on a free-lance bases, is willing to assume the directorship of development for the duration.

Two arguments frustrated his appointment in the end. Argument 1: He is over 45 years of age, and a short time before the company had let several older workers go and in doing so reached an agreement with the union in questions that no more workers over a certain age limit could be given employment. The union insists on the agreement being kept.

Obstacle 2: Employees in a supervisory capacity argue that at a certain management level in the company part-time solutions are not possible and they fear that the desire for part time will spread among other managers. Rigidity in thinking and organization emerges everywhere in this instance, which could be multiplied any number of times when the goal is to set up project groups or exploration groups within the company.

Thesis 3: In management training, innovation management is not taken seriously enough, particularly when related to the systematic planning of the company's technological profile and to marketing.

The "management of change" or "management of innovation" requires of a management specific learning-related and method-related knowledge and abilities which are usually not covered in general management training.

For instance, in planning the company's technological profile it is not just a matter of providing design and manufacturing knowhow, but also of determining the anticipated demand, in which case the direct and indirect variables affecting technological requirements, which come from the markets, have to be dealt with.

Or: systematically guaranteeing a new generation of ideas by means of strategic innovation management, the evaluation of individual ideas and finally the implementation of a strategy for innovation, whether with or without state funds, make demands on individual managers with respect to risks and uncertainties, for which special training should prepare them.

It is my impression that specific gaps exist with respect to innovation in marketing, that is with respect to innovative market strategies, whether these are related to the domestic or the export market. Experimental marketing policies in which new forms of marketing are tested, either domestically or abroad, having practical limits and limited in time and region, require special training, otherwise they are not even tested because of the sheer uncertainty.

In the export sphere, just from the area of marketing innovation, one can mention the challenges in the fields of typical and atypical exchange of goods, in replacing the marketing of machines and equipment by the marketing of systems or variably comprehensive infrastructure financing, which is being required more and more frequently, particularly with large-scale projects. This is not even to mention leasing models and marketing clustering models, in which the contributions of several middle-level companies are focussed across a single bridgehead.

The great achievements of the German economy domestically and on the export markets should not be overshadowed by the examples from the marketing area, the intention is to refute the thesis that the German economy is being pinched by the shoe of innovation only in the area of technology.

If the theses are summarized, we find that crucial barriers to innovation exist in the non-technological area, namely in the fateful linking of the state and the economy in the networks of market economics and non-market economics and the bureaucratic barriers contained in it, in the rigid structures of how a company and work flow are organized and in a training gap in innovation management.

A state and economic policy aimed at technological innovation in the narrower sense can only be successful if these barriers to innovation are removed, quite apart from the normal industrial management needs in the area of personnel, capital, location and information.

9581

CSO: 3620/289

## PUBLIC DEFICIT SEEN OBSTRUCTING ECONOMIC UPTURN

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 14 Apr 84 p 9

/Text/ The large deficits of the public sector negatively affect the Greek economy and are a serious obstacle to its upturn, according to the chairman of the Athens Commerce and Industry Chamber /EVE/, Azares Efraimoglou. Speaking at the general meeting of the Greek-American Chamber, Efraimoglou underlined the following about the Greek economy:

The deficits of the public sector must be reduced by limiting the expenditures, not by imposing new taxes or by increasing prices.

The more effective management of the public sector and the implementation of reforms can result in significant savings. Efraimoglou believes it is possible to limit the current cost of the services provided by the public sector.

The Athens EVE chairman believes the current methods are insufficient and obsolete compared to the new management techniques applied in other countries. He proposes that the management supervision and the methods of public services and agencies be done by expert cadres from the private sector.

Complete freedom in the movement of foreign exchange will result in the influx of capital in our country in the long run.

Efraimoglou then spoke on the control of prices and profits, which in his view should be implemented only in extraordinary circumstances (war, strikes, earthquakes, etc.).

The unhindered functioning of the rules of the market assures the best possible price and quality of the products. Otherwise, there will be distortion with all the undesirable side effects (reduced competitiveness, lower production, lower quality, an underground market, etc.).

As an illustration of this reasoning, Efraimoglou mentioned that in Britain, it is estimated that for every one percent of reduction in domestic production because of the import of similar products, 75,000 are added to the list of the unemployed.

In conclusion, the Athens EVE chairman said that the market control must be limited to the quality and to compliance with the approved specifications of the products because the conditions which existed in 1946 and lead to the establishment of the market control system with a legislative decree by the Damaskinos government (without a Parliament) have changed, yet the system remains.

7520

CS0: 3521/240

## GOALS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMPANY

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 19 Apr 84 p 11

/Text/ Alternate Minister of National Economy K. Vaitsos announced the establishment of an International Trade Corporation by four investment banks (the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank /ETVA/, the Agricultural Bank of Greece /ATE/, the National Investment Bank for Industrial Development /ETEVA/, and the Investment Bank). Its objectives are:

1. To sell as a package products and services produced by Greek industries in which the state has more than 50 percent ownership. The same package may include products of the private sector. More specifically, this corporation will be active in the implementation of agreements reached between governments.
2. To offer specialized services and information to interested enterprises in the private sector, to promote the marketing of their products and services abroad.
3. At the same time this corporation will proceed with the establishment of new enterprises with specialized objectives to improve exports; it may also participate in existing enterprises in order to strengthen in many ways the improvement of our exports.
4. Finally, the corporation will create an autonomous network to promote exports based on modern methods for the expansion of markets, using for this private-economy criteria.

The initial capital of the corporation is 80 million drachmas to be increased to 400 million drachmas within 1984. Shareholders are the three development banks (ETVA, ETEVA, and Investment Bank) and ATE. The structure and organizational setup of this export corporation corresponds to the most strict specifications derived from the international experience in this sector of specialized agencies for the export trade.

In this way our country is taking a great step forward for the modernization of economic mechanisms. More specifically, our export trade acquires a new weapon in the upturn of the economy and in the increase of the competitiveness of the Greek products.



## Commercial Missions

At the same time, Vaitzos announced commercial missions to the US, Algeria, etc. He added:

The US is a particularly important pole of attraction for our country's export potential. However, our exports to the US are way below our realistic possibilities if we leave out the petroleum products. Our exports to the US face many obstacles due to the absence of appropriate preparation and infrastructure as well as to the weakness of individual business efforts.

The Ministry of National Economy has already moved forward with important steps designed to expand the connections of our economy with the possibilities existing in the American market in the investment and commercial sectors, both for the Greek producers and for many American importers who showed great interest in many Greek products.

Already, in this context, following instructions of the alternate minister, a special commercial mission visited the city of Philadelphia from 20 to 25 February 1984.

## Algeria

Following previous contacts, a mission representing the Ministry of National Economy and other factors, on 7-9 April 1984, contacted and discussed with various ministries and agencies in Algiers. The transactions of the two countries have entered a course of steady and many sided expansion and with the success of this mission one more step was made in this direction.

Our country purchased 910,000 tons of crude oil which will be transported in Greek ships.

At the same time, it was agreed to sell to Algeria approximately 50,000 tons of summer potatoes, with delivery starting in September 1984.

There was also discussion about increasing Algerian imports of cement, which are expected to go up to 1 million tons from 500,000.

Finally, there was positive discussion on the export of sizable quantities of currants in the context of a long-term agreement of cooperation with the Greek Agricultural Products Export Co. /AGREX/.

Other talks aimed at the expansion of cooperation in the construction of land reclamation and infrastructure projects. The Algerian Ministry of Housing is expected to submit the appropriate proposals.

On the other hand, to carry on these initiatives and to broaden the contacts, it was agreed that during the first 10 days of May a Greek mission will visit Algeria. The mission will include representatives of:

1. The Central Service for the Separation of Domestic Products /KYDEP/ to sign a contract for the export of 40,000 tons of flour, soft wheat and fodder.
2. Industries to sign contracts for the export of detergents, glass plates, sanitary items, and floor tiles.

Finally, a mission of the Algerian textile organization is expected on 23 April 1984 to visit Greek textile plants in order to put into effect the interest expressed during the talks on the purchase of yarn and textiles.

The mission, which will visit Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman during the first half of May, is completing its preparations. A little later it is expected to have talks in Libya and Egypt.

In all these countries the missions will talk with specialized public and private agencies to promote to their final stage agreements for the export of industrial and farm products, building materials, and special contracts on the export of services.

7520  
CSO: 3521/240

## RETURNEE GUESTWORKERS DISGRUNTLED BY ECONOMIC PARALYSIS

Bonn VORWARTS in German 29 Mar 84 p 19

[Article by Faruk Sen: "Almost no Chance at All"]

[Text] In the last months, more than 14,000 Turkish workers have returned to Turkey with their families. But with an unemployment rate of just under 20 percent, their chances of finding a place in the Turkish labor market are not very great. And most of them don't want this at all.

According to a study by the State Planning Office in Turkey, 76 percent of the Turkish workers from the Federal Republic have stated that after their return they would like to operate independently. Up to now, however, only six percent of them have been able to establish themselves.

The attempt to make a living by starting small businesses or by the acquisition of real estate has often failed.

The constantly rising inflation rate in Turkey and the market conditions in the country, which the returnees were usually unfamiliar with, have caused individual investments to fail for years. In areas in which large Turkish concerns invest heavily, the chances for small businesses with little capital of their own have been zero from the beginning.

Placing the returnees in the workplace has always been difficult because of the job shortage. At present, 950,000 new workers enter the market each year.

Therefore the question arises of a sensible model for the reentry of those who wish to return in spite of the economically difficult situation in Turkey. The present so-called Turkish model of workers' cooperatives has a long and rather dark history.

The first cooperative was founded in 1966 in Cologne. Numerous cooperatives followed, so that by 1983 there were 322 in Turkey with about 155,000 members from the Federal Republic.

The main goal of the cooperatives was to create new jobs that would promote the reentry of Turkish workers. The principle of these cooperatives is that

returnees buy shares in the organizations with their savings. Many cooperatives have been founded by inhabitants of the same area, who in this way not only want to create new jobs, but also to contribute to the development of their homeland.

On the basis of this model, the returnees hoped to be able to develop independently of the state and the private sector.

According to the latest study by the Turkish bank, Desiyab, only 20 percent of these cooperatives are working successfully at present. The rest face bankruptcy or a takeover by large concerns. It will probably be difficult in the future to build a new existence in Turkey on the basis of cooperatives.

The Turkish labor market is not much interested in the returnees, who are now seeking employment at age 40-45. Instead, young workers are hired at the minimum wage of about 140 marks.

9124

CSO: 3520/288

## DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, PAST MISTAKES

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 19 Apr 84 p 9

[Interview with former Minister Aristeidis Kalatzakos by Mikh. Kanimas; place not specified]

[Text] DEI [Public Power Corporation] as a public-utility enterprise, its rates and PASOK's general policy in the energy sector recently have been subjects of many parliamentary, television and other discussions; the lead players have been representatives of the government and the parties (mainly New Democracy). Many things have been said from all directions, but fairly many questions--and the positionings vis-a-vis them would probably interest many people--have remained unanswered.

MESIMVRINI is covering this "gap" today with an interview it received from the former minister, now president of the Parliamentary Work Group (OKE) for Energy and National Resources and deputy from Messini, Aristeidis Kalatzakos, who answered with specific data all the questions we put to him.

Mr. Kalatzakos' answers "justify" New Democracy's specific positions vis-a-vis energy policy issues and indicate the official opposition's complaints about the policy followed by PASOK on DEI issues.

Question: ND has maintained that the failures of the DEI Administration and the non-existence of an energy program have made Greece a country with imported electric power. What are the data which confirm this opinion?

Answer: It is a fact that under PASOK the country's dependence on electric power imported from abroad has increased. Thus, in 1981 the cost of purchasing electric power from abroad was 808 million drachmas. In 1983, we paid 7,600 million drachmas. For 1984, payments to buy electric power from abroad are expected to reach 12,000 million drachmas, according to the estimates of DEI itself. This sum will buy 2,450 million kilowatt-hours this year, versus only 286 in 1981, which represent approximately 11 percent of the country's electric-power requirement, whereas in 1981 the purchases represented 1.5 percent. Consequently, 11 percent of the electric power will not be produced by Greek hands, according to PASOK's beloved expression.

In order for me to give you the most representative picture of what the purchase of 2,450 million kilowatt-hours means, it suffices for me to remark that this energy is equivalent to the constant operation, for 1.5 years, of one of the four 300-megawatt units which the ND government planned and built in Kardina-Ptolemais.



I could even say that the energy which will be bought in 1984 is equivalent to one-third of the energy which will be used by home consumers. That is, one out of every three Greek home consumers will not be supplied by DEI units, but by units installed in foreign countries like Bulgaria, Russia, Yugoslavia, Albania, etc., to the glory of PASOK's proud and independent policy.

All of eastern Makedonia and Thraki, a border area of strategic importance--which includes the nomes of Evros, Rodopi, Xanthi, Kavala, Serrai and Kilkis--has been cut off, for about two years now, from the rest of the DEI network and has been attached to the Bulgarian one.

Finally, the government's policy results in the total imported energy--not only in the form of electric-power purchases, but simultaneously in the form of oil and coal procurements to produce electricity--rising, under PASOK, from 6,060 million kilowatt-hours in 1981 to 8,600 in 1984; that is, we have a 42-percent increase in dependence on every form of imported energy.

Question: In your opinion, what are the reasons which led DEI to proceed to such large purchases of electric-power from abroad?

Answer: There are four main reasons which created the energy shortages: a. Insufficient lignite production. b. Predatory exploitation of water reserves in 1982 which caused a drop in the level of the hydroelectric stations' lakes. c. Delays in construction of DEI production works. d. Dismissals of experienced and capable officers.

Question: Since the centroid of DEI's energy policy is the lignite factor, would you please develop for us, on general lines, what is happening today on this critical issue?

Answer: The ND governments--with a goal of the country's energy independence--had put in operation five 300-megawatt units, which burned local lignite, in the areas of Ptolemais and Megalopolis; at the same time it had proceeded to construction of the mining equipment for supplying these units with lignite. Their output is equivalent to a savings of two million tons of oil a year.

They also put under construction six 300-megawatt lignite units in Ptolemais-Amyndaion which would begin operation in stages, at a rate of two a year, in the 1983-1985 period.

PASOK's dogmatic perceptions and their negative position vis-a-vis the works planned by ND, as well as the dissolution of DEI services by the interferences of party claquers in their work, led to the biddings which had occurred under ND not being awarded, with the result that there is a two and-one-half year delay in orders of the necessary equipment for lignite production by the corresponding mines.

Thus the first two Agios Dimitrios units in Ptolemais are not expected to operate at all in 1984 since they will have no lignite. In 1985, while the four Agios Dimitrios units will have been built, because of a shortage in lignite, only one will operate, under the best conditions. In 1986, the two Amyndaion units will operate, because of the inexcusable delay in procurement of mining equipment, only

with excavating and transporting of lignite by a private contractor, a fact which PASOK has disapproved of in the past, and with the predatory exploitation of the best part of the deposit, that is, by withdrawing the "fillet." This tactic is a patchwork solution and will end up at the expense of the mine's future exploitation.

Moreover, the serious issue of the indirect consignment of the greatest part of the mining equipment to the socialized PYRKAL, which will prove to be the grave-digger for DEI's energy program, must be stressed.

Question: In the "Open Papers" broadcast on 9 April, Minister Kouloumbis stated that operation of the Agios Georgios power station in Keratsini will end on 30 April, and charged that in 1981 ND stopped the plant's operation for reasons of pre-electoral expediency. What opinion do you have about this issue?

Answer: ND did not close Keratsini for pre-electoral reasons, but in order to protect the health of the inhabitants of the capital. ND made this decision given that, with the correct planning of production works, it had ensured sufficient energy from the new lignite units. Proof of this is the fact that the present government could keep it closed for two and one-half years.

We believe conversely, that the promise the minister gave, if it is finally implemented, is really pre-electoral pyrotechnics, which will be revealed after the Euro-parliamentary elections.

It is certain that the huge energy shortages will force them to operate it again after the summer period in which the load is decreased perceptibly. Already, during the first three months of 1984, the station produced 523 million kilowatt-hours, consuming 130,000 tons of mazut and running permanently on a 24-hour basis.

Question: Naturally, the recent increases in DEI rates are of concern to electricity consumers, particularly those with a small income. The government maintains that 35 percent of home consumers are not being burdened with any increase. Do you think this is realistic?

Answer: The Greek people are paying the price for the government's mistakes in the energy sector. Already, in 1983, DEI showed a deficit in its balance on the order of 3.5 billion drachmas. The picture of the enterprise appears far more unfavorable for 1984, in spite of the additional burden on consumers of 27 billion drachmas from the March increases.

The government's assertion that 35 percent of the consumers are not being burdened with any new increase is a deceptive tactic. In reality:

1. Three hundred and twenty-thousand meters--that is, 10 percent of the total consumers--have zero consumption.
2. On the remaining 25 percent, that is another 860,000 consumers who show a consumption of 0 to 100 kilowatt-hours in the two months, a fixed contribution of 100 drachmas (two months) is imposed.

Thus, their increase fluctuates from 16 to 105 percent. Moreover, DEI increased by 31.5 percent the nighttime rate which served 335,000 consumers.

Comparing the increases in home rates which occurred under ND in the period 1974-1981 with the increases in the two and one-half years PASOK has governed, we observe that the average yearly increase in the ND period was 15.5 percent, while the increases since 1981 have been 21 percent a year.

It must be stressed that ND faced two energy crises, that is, a tripling of the price of oil, whereas under PASOK a decrease of 15 percent in its price has been noted internationally.

Question: What other issues could you refer to relative to the electricity sector?

Answer: First, despite the great energy shortages which have been created by PASOK's mistaken policy, the government is planning unthinkingly a series of energy-eating industries, like the lignite-gas and aluminum factories. Operation of the lignite-gas factory in the Kozani area alone will require 6 to 10 million tons of lignite a year, which will lead to a decline in the lignite units in the Ptolemais area since the lignite destined for their operation will be decreased significantly.

Second, the government brought forward as a new technological achievement mixed lignite and coal combustion in the Ptolemais and Aliverion units, with a goal of increasing the units' power. However, it is concealing from the Greek people the fact that coal was used to cover part of the huge energy shortages and that the effects on the operation and economic life of the units will be most serious.

Third, indicative of the complete confusion and lack of coordination is the suspension of the much-advertised mixed lignite and coal combustion in Aliverion where, while there had been a procurement, with an indirect consignment, of 60,000 tons of coal, the corresponding required lignite was unable to be obtained. As a result, the coal worth 2.5 million dollars is being rendered useless in the station yard by weather conditions, while the Aliverion unit has been operating since October 1983 by burning pure oil on a 24-hour basis.

Fourth, with the impetus they have in devising off-hand solutions, they are planning to use in DEI oil units a special type of heavy fuel which will be produced with combustion in the Aspropyrgos state refineries. As is known, however, this fuel is hard to transport and contains a five-percent proportion of sulfur, that is, 10 times more than the mazut which is burned at Keratsini. Thus, competent circles are discussing installation of a new electric-power generation unit in the environmentally encumbered Aspropyrgos area, or the unrealistic solution of moving the Aspropyrgos refinery close to the Lavrion or Aliverion petrol units.

The solution of using heavy fuel, which will prove in practice to be infeasible or uneconomical, is creating delusions in the DEI administration which believes that the use of the special fuel in its units will free it from the anxiety of insufficient lignite it created itself with the non-existence of correct planning.

The only result will be DEI's entanglement, with a significant participation, in the huge Aspropyrgos investment, on the order of 30 billion drachmas.

Fifth, the bad exploitation of the DEI system, which is being aggravated by the interventions of irresponsible syndicalist party organs, is resulting in more frequent

breakdowns in the units' operation which are beyond the normal limit, with most serious economic repercussions and dangers of a new black-out. Thus, for example, to repair the Lavrion gas turbines, the government paid 400 million drachmas in exchange, with an indirect consignment to a foreign firm; that is, as much as purchasing these units cost.

Sixth, analogous phenomena will appear in Crete's independent electric system, where there is a three and one-half year delay in installation of the 60-megawatt Diesel units which ND had planned to begin operation in 1984. Instead of these, DEI is forced to hastily transport a gas turbine from Lavrion to cover, at more than double the cost, the energy shortages on this island.

Finally, I am obliged to express my great uneasiness about the weighty inheritance which will fall on the shoulders of the new government, which will be called to deal with the effects from the off-handedness with which the present government has handled the country's whole energy problem.

9247

CSO: 3521/248

## ENVIRONMENTAL CONFERENCE ON DESTRUCTION OF COASTAL ECOLOGY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 26, 27, 28 Apr 84

[26 Apr 84 p 1]

[Text] The Fourth European Conference on the Environment began yesterday, with 21 countries belonging to the Council of Europe taking part. The theme of the 3-day conference is the prevention of further damage to littoral zones in Europe (seas, lake shores, and river banks) as a result of a lack of planning in connection with economic development.

The opening speech was given by Minister of Physical Planning, Housing, and Environment A. Tritsis, who said among other things:

"We are living in a time of crisis, and not only economic crisis. Of crisis at the level of peace and the environment, but above all of crisis in values, such that:

"a) We can label as realistic certain short-sighted projects and developmental patterns (in agriculture, tourism, and industry) which drag catastrophe itself along with them and destroy the resources on which they are based.

"b) We can abandon and ruin traditional ways of development (farming, hydroponics, and so forth) which have been valued down through the centuries and which have survived because of the stability of the developmental process which they represent.

"The area where this irrationality becomes the most evident is that of the littoral zones (seas, lake shores, and river banks). And here immediate action is essential, following the proper awakening of society, because there is a threat of utter catastrophe here.

"The important coastal areas of Europe are being limited, since greater and greater pressure from conflicting interests is being exerted on them. Pressure for industrial installations, for intensive agricultural and fishing uses, for large-scale tourism and for summer housing, and also for communication, energy, and defense projects. All these things create pollution, disturb the ecosystems, and destroy coasts and natural resources.



"The forces and trends of destruction are such that we cannot afford the luxury of idleness or of merely ceremonial meetings among ourselves. For this reason, I hope that our meeting will be substantive."

#### A Manifesto

A manifesto from the European Environmental Office, which echoes the views on the protection of the European environment held by the European organizations concerned with administration of European bodies, will be presented today by Mr (David), the secretary general of this office.

The announcement of the manifesto is being done on the occasion of the presence in our country of the European environmental ministers. It will be made at a press conference which the Greek Society will give today in the foreign correspondents' hall. The manifesto of the European Office refers to the following points:

1) Concerning an economy of conservation, 2) agriculture, 3) energy, 4) transportation, 5) land-use planning and decent housing, 6) cultural heritage, 7) preservation of the natural environment, 8) pollution, 9) health and the environment, 10) toxic substances, 11) developmental programs, 12) society and decision-making.

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"The environment of Europe is the common heritage of all European citizens. We hold it in trust for our children and for the children who will take possession of it. This constitutes a responsibility but also an opportunity for us. The present crisis which prevails in Europe is not simply an institutional or economic crisis. Rather what we have is a crisis of the spirit, a crisis of vision.

"The members of the European Parliament who are to be elected next June should deal with this problem. For them to succeed in this, they should offer a certain vision: The assuming of an obligation to improve the quality of life in Europe."

The above were stressed, among other things, by Mr (David), the secretary general of the European Environmental Office, in the presentation--given by him at an appropriate press conference yesterday--of the manifesto drawn up by this office, which is the federation of environmental, non-governmental organizations of the European countries.

At this conference, which was organized by the "Greek Society," (David) said that next September this office will compile a "guide" which it will give to the Eurodeputies who are elected in June, for the sake of the more systematic handling of the environmental problems. As an initial step, this manifesto has already been drawn up--a manifesto which was cosigned by 63 environmentalists from 10 member states.

## Belongs to Everyone

Some mentioned principles--from the 10 typewritten pages--of the manifesto are the following: As Mr (David) also stressed in his speech, "a new model of development should be designed and implemented which is better adjusted to the human needs of both developed countries and of countries which are now developing." This model should be solidly grounded on the following principles:

--That the European environment belongs to all Europeans, those now living and those to come, and that it is a duty of the European Parliament to protect this environment from ruinous exploitation.

--That the European environment is a part of the global environment, and therefore the European Parliament should ponder the consequences to the world as a whole, including the Third World, from the decisions it makes from time to time.

--That the active participation of the people of Europe in drawing up such decisions is a prerequisite for their acceptance and implementation.

--That among all the threats to the environment, war in all its forms is the greatest. Thus, it is the duty of the European Parliament to use all its powers to avert war and to refrain from adopting decisions which can lead to war.

(David) also referred to separate points, concerning which he stressed, among other things, with respect to an economy of conservation: The Community should grant tax incentives to encourage the use of recycled raw materials. It should find mechanisms which will promote durability in all consumer goods, should encourage the replacement of non-renewable resources by renewable ones, should support the briefing of the public with respect to the flow of resources within the economy and the consequences which this flow has on the environment, and finally it should promote the establishment of small and intermediate businesses and exercise a more decisive control over the multinational companies.

As for agriculture, there should be a promoting of the harmonious development of the agricultural economy in the less advantaged areas, so as to shift towards the outer areas of the Community the agriculture-industry network--this being something which could provide the basis for a healthy social and economic development and a better quality of life.

On the issue of energy, the Community has already reached a decision having to do with ensuring a reliable and flexible supply of energy. For this reason, special importance should be attached to heat--that form of energy which is in the greatest demand--instead of electricity, and greater use should be made of systems for recovering heat and of heat pumps.

As a source of heat, electricity is wasteful. Europe should concentrate its efforts specifically on research and development in the use and propagation of solar energy and photovoltaic systems, and should take all

the requisite measures to promote a strong common market in solar applications.

Another important point is the issue of pollution. In this connection--according to the principles of the manifesto--all lead should be removed from petroleum. The use of hormones in stockbreeding should cease immediately. Air pollution at electric-power plants and other sources should be reduced significantly by the legislating of austere economy measures in the consumption of energy.

The issue of wastes cannot be solved by "arbitrary" restrictive measures. The Community should proceed to a policy of resources (raw materials, and so forth) which can permit reducing wastes to a minimum.

The proceedings of the 4th European Conference of Environmental Ministers from the 21 states of the Council of Europe also continued yesterday, with the theme being planning for and managing the sea-coasts, lake shores, and river banks.

Mr Tritsis referred to the problem of the coasts, saying that in fact the Mediterranean countries of the south are experiencing tremendous pressures from tourism, which is having serious repercussions on the coasts.

Many of the visitors--continued Tritsis--come from the countries of the north, and they frequently complain that they cannot find clean beaches. Perhaps what is needed is for a commonly undertaken informational campaign to be conducted for both local people and visitors so as to protect the coasts. This could be a project involving a dialogue--one of the things which we are trying to provide, he said--between the north and the south.

Finally, Tritsis called on the parliamentarians to become more active in sensitizing the people to the issues of the environment.

The 21 environmental ministers departed yesterday for Aktion, where they will visit Amvrakikos Gulf. This is one of the most unusual biotopes in Europe.

During their stay, they will have discussions with the nomarchs of the surrounding nomes, as well as with town mayors in the area.

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[Text] The protection of the environment can contribute to the economic recovery, environmental policy ought to be an integral part of economic policy, and the cost of measures for the protection of the environment must not be differentiated from the cost of development generally. The view must be that the resources which the environment offers us should not only lay the foundation for but also set the limits on economic development. The time has arrived to implement these basic principles which have taken shape in the last 10 years and to incorporate them in the process of charting policy.

These things are stressed in a joint communique which was issued at the conclusion of proceedings of the 4th European conference of the environmental ministers from the 21 member countries of the Council of Europe.

These principles are the basis for its Guide to Environmental Policy, which the governments are called on to consult before they implement planning and management policy in what concerns the preservation of coastal areas, river banks, and lake shores. National legislation and regulations must provide for an effective protection of the ecosystems of these areas. And the various international organs responsible for their preservation and for the prevention of pollution must coordinate their activities. The ecological and physical value of the coastal areas and inland shores will have to be defined and their international, national, regional, and local importance will have to be emphasized.

The planning practices should be based on a profound knowledge of the ecological characteristics and requirements of the areas. They should also be based on an integrated and long-range approach to the different and frequently conflicting interests which are being compromised, as well as on an assessment of their effect on the environment.

These measures, continues the communique, are just some of all the measures which have been proposed by the conference either to the European governments or to the committee of ministers of the Council of Europe.

Within the framework of the conference there was also a "conversation" between the ministers and the members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the council, including also its chairman, (Karl Arens).

The main theme of the conference was: "Coastal areas, river banks and lake shores; planning and management concerning these in harmony with the ecological balance." The conference adopted proposals relating to planning and to legislation in this sector and in the sector of the preservation of plants and animals and of their immediate environment. It examined also the changes which have been seen in the environment since the previous conference (Bern, 1979), when the great importance of a European agreement on the preservation of the animals and plants of Europe and of their physical environment was also attested to.

The conference recalled on this occasion that some other countries are also going to ratify the agreement in 1984, in addition to the 12 countries plus the EEC which have already ratified it. It called on the Council of Europe to give major priority to another European agreement which is being studied at this moment and which concerns protection from the polluting of international bodies of water.

Mr Tritsis

Mr Tritsis closed the conference by stressing "that this was an important meeting which is evidence of the need for action and for implementing decisions." Tritsis said that "we took care to debate among ourselves not only as ministers but also as representatives of the European Parliament."

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